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MATERIAL AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN FRIEDRICH VON 
HARDENBERG'S HEINRICH VON AFTERDINGEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
  In an attempt to widen interpretations, this study first explores the myths associated with 
Friedrich von Hardenberg, commonly known as Novalis, which have resulted in the 
neglect of material interpretations of his works. After an introduction to Hardenberg's 
theory of the Self and Karl Marx's theory of alienation, an analysis of Hardenberg's most 
widely read work, Heinrich von Afterdingen, demonstrates how Hardenberg was as 
concerned with the material and the social relations among human beings and their labor 
as he was with their spiritual endeavors. The self-development of Heinrich, the main 
character in Afterdingen, is chronicled in this study with special attention given to his 
material existence as well as the material existence of the people he encounters. This 
study demonstrates that Afterdingen can be read as a handbook for the development of 
the Self according to the theories of Hardenberg and Marx, in which the Self cannot favor 
the spiritual realm, or inner existence, at the expense of its material and social relations. 
Rather, these two spheres are both important for full self-development. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE JENA ROMANTICS AND THE CONCEPT OF 
PROGRESS 
  
 The circle of thinkers who congregated around the German city of Jena at the very 
end of the eighteenth century until the beginning of the nineteenth century have come to 
be known as the Romantics. This designation was made around 1805, but referred in fact 
to a different group of thinkers who met after the early Romantics in Jena had disbanded.1 
The definitions and connotations of Romanticism have undergone many changes 
throughout history and only reached their contemporary meaning in the mid-nineteenth 
century. The development of the term romantic is chronicled by Ernst Behler in his work, 
German Romantic Literary Theory.2 Behler explains the term romantic as it was used in 
the late-eighteenth century as consisting of two parts: the chronological and the 
typographical. The chronological links the term to the tradition of epic literature in the 
Middle Ages. This literature was held in low-esteem and was not considered part of the 
canon. The typological refers to the compositional and structural variations prominent in 
Romantic literature. The negative connotations of the term, especially in its association 
with literature of the Middle Ages are evident. The movement was quickly seen as 
reactionary in its idealization of the Middle Ages, a view which lasted well into the 
nineteenth century and was echoed by Heinrich Heine in The Romantic School: "But 
what was the Romantic School in Germany? It was nothing other than the revival of the 
poetry of the Middle Ages."3 Behler goes on to define the meaning of the word, citing 
members of the Jena Romantics, who although they never labeled their movement 
Romantic, did write about the term. In their analysis, the historical and chronological 
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arguments identifying their literature as reactionary disappears and is replaced with an 
abstract notion typical of the Jena Romantics. The romantic is synonymous with the 
poetic and is something that absorbs its audience. Any notion of completion of the 
romantic is dispensed with, which meant that the Jena Romantics did not have to offer an 
ultimate goal for their poetic endeavors: "Romantic poetry, precisely because of its 
incompletion, is infinite" (Behler 29). 
 Behler's analysis focuses exclusively on literature. However, in  The Romantic 
Imperative, Frederick Beiser points out the fallacy of this approach by stating that 
Romantic aesthetics derived its meaning from its ethical and political values: "The ethical 
and political have primacy over the literary and critical in the sense that the romantic 
devotion to aesthetics was ultimately guided by their ethical and political ideas" (24). The 
often esoteric writings of the Romantics were rooted in solid ethical and political 
convictions. It was not their heads that were in the clouds, but rather their aspirations. 
The fallacy of studying only the literature of the early Romantics has led to a lack of 
attention being paid to their foundational principles resulting in two unfortunate 
phenomena outlined by Beiser: 
 First, most philosophers ignore the subject because they think that the central 
 concerns of early romanticism fall within the realm of literature. Second, the 
 subject has been almost the exclusive preserve of literary scholars, who do not 
 focus sufficient attention on the fundamental metaphysical, epistemological, 
 ethical, and political ideas that are the real foundation of early romanticism. (8)  
In this study, I will focus on the ethical and political foundations of early Romanticism, 
those which, according to Beiser, have been neglected in scholarly work.  
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 Apart from the problem of defining Romanticism in a concrete all-encompassing 
manner, the problematic of seeing intellectual and literary movements as necessary 
progressions through history needs to be addressed: "[I]t is premature and almost 
nonsensical to believe that progress must of necessity come about."4 Intellectual and 
literary movements such as the Enlightenment and Romanticism have as their goal the 
progressive development of human potential. In true romantic fashion, this study rejects 
the notion that abstract concepts, such as "progression," pertains to anything but 
individuals. Human progress is possible, but it must start with the individual before the 
progression of society is possible. Marx and Engels described the communist revolution, 
which might some day take place, as starting with individuals and then working in a 
hierarchal fashion upwards: "In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by 
another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end 
to."5  
 Inevitable universal progression over time through intellectual and literary 
movements forming new syntheses, such as the shift from Enlightenment to Romanticism, 
is an illusion. "Progression" in the sense of shifting cultural movements is nothing more 
than addition, where addition is deprived of all positive connotations outside of a 
mathematical number sequence. For example: 1 + 4 = 5 is not progress, rather addition. 
Addition necessitates subtraction. Following the Saussurean linguistic model, where 
meaning is derived from polar opposites, addition has no meaning without subtraction. 
Progress is therefore addition and subtraction. However, subtraction pertaining to 
movements is not absolute. Rather, elements are consciously deemphasized. Progress 
defined in this manner presupposes the intertextuality of movements. Romanticism is 
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comprised of additions to and subtractions from Enlightenment concepts, additions and 
subtractions from concepts represented in movements of opposition within the 
Enlightenment, such as Storm and Stress and Pietism, as well as movements before the 
Enlightenment. Romanticism, or any subsequent movement for that matter, must bear the 
weight of what came before. Additions and subtractions of concepts are borrowings from 
previous movements or reactions to concepts based on their presence or lack thereof 
within a movement. An example of one concept emphasized in Romanticism is feeling. 
This is an addition as a reaction to the lack thereof in the Enlightenment, which 
emphasized reason. The Romantics subtracted the rules governing form that was 
prevalent during the Enlightenment and also in Classicism. The Romantics were not 
concerned with their works forming a harmonious whole or employing the symmetry that 
is required in a classic tragedy. Rather, they favored a mixing of genres and a 
fragmentary writing style. These additions and subtractions are what constitute the shift 
in movements; however, they cannot be seen as progression. Progression of human 
potential, or that of becoming completely human, is left to individuals within each 
cultural, intellectual, or literary movement. One of the individuals that sought true 
progression for himself and provided guides for others on how to reach their potential 
was Georg Philip Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg. 
 Friedrich von Hardenberg, who is better known by his pseudonym, Novalis, was 
part of the Jena Romantics. His body of work illustrates how prolific the thought of Early 
German Romanticism was. Hardenberg was not only a great poet, but also a brilliant 
theoretician and a successful salt mine assessor. Had he not died of tuberculosis at an 
early age, there is no telling with how many fields he would have occupied himself. 
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Despite the great variety of his writings, the typical perception of Hardenberg does him 
little justice in that he normally is thought of merely as a Romantic poet, and sometimes 
as one who has completely lost touch with reality. This false conception is due to the 
many myths associated with him. When speaking of Hardenberg today, one usually refers 
to him by his pseudonym, Novalis. This is symptomatic of the strength that the myths 
have gathered over many years. In this study, in an attempt to distinguish between the 
man and the persona, I will only refer to Novalis when speaking of the mythical 
perception of Hardenberg. Accordingly, the initial sections of my study will attempt to 
debunk some of the myths associated with Hardenberg so that my larger task, that of 
showing the emphases of material and practical existence in Hardenberg, can be taken 
seriously. These sections will be followed by an introduction to Hardenberg's philosophy, 
specifically his theory of the Self. Then, an examination of the concept of alienation, or 
estrangement, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts by Karl Marx will 
demonstrate how the idealist philosophy of Hardenberg and the material philosophy of 
Marx are quite similar in their conclusions about the constitution of a developed Self. 
Hardenberg and Marx would normally be considered to be at opposite ends of the critical 
spectrum, but this study will demonstrate that that is not necessarily the case. The link 
between the theories of Hardenberg and those of Marx will then be examined in 
Hardenberg's most well-known work, Heinrich von Afterdingen.  
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MYTHS ASSOCIATED WITH FRIEDRICH VON HARDENBERG 
  
 No serious attempt to discover the real Friedrich von Hardenberg is complete 
without dealing with the various long-held myths pertaining to his life. The mystery that 
frequently shrouds his life-story is the result of these myths, or "distancing agents," 
which in turn came about because of unreliable accounts about Hardenberg's life, because 
of many letters as well as journal entries, and because of the blind eye that many have 
had for the concrete actions over the course of his life. Normally, I would refrain from 
devoting a large portion of a study such as this on biographical information about the 
author. I agree with Friedrich Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals where he assigns 
preference to an artist's work over the artist himself: "[I]t is always well to divorce an 
artist from his work, and to take him less seriously than it. He is after all, only a condition 
of the work, the soil from which it grows, perhaps only the manure on that soil. Thus he 
is, in most cases, something that must be forgotten if one wants to enter into the full 
enjoyment of the work"1 In this case, however, it seems appropriate to provide some 
background material. Generally, biographical information often can limit interpretations 
of a work, since the reader may tend to read a text looking for biographical information. 
In other cases, the biographical information with which the reader is already familiar also 
can limit interpretations of a text, as is the case with Hardenberg. John Hawes, a Franz 
Kafka scholar, found that in order to find new ways of interpreting Kafka, the myths 
associated with him must first be clarified. This is the task that he sets forth in his very 
recent work, Why You Should Read Kafka Before You Waste Your Life.2 He speaks of an 
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innocent method of reading Kafka, in which myths and biographical information does not 
limit interpretation:  
 I suggest we need a brand-new theory of how to read Kafka's writing. The oldest 
 theory of all. The theory used by Kafka's first readers, who–lucky them 
 them!–knew nothing of Felice, Milena, Hermann Kafka, the diaries […]. We can't 
 read Kafka's writing in this innocent way. The trouble with being human (as 
 Adam and Eve found out) is that you can't unknow things. Since we inescapably 
 know things about Kafka, the only option we have is to know them properly. 
 (188-89) 
 In order to more properly know about Friedrich von Hardenberg, and since 
"unknowing" the information with which one already is familiar is very difficult, it is 
necessary to discuss certain myths, and I will discuss the following three myths in this 
chapter: the "Sophie myth" has received the most attention and has served to distract 
readers from other aspects of Hardenberg's life. Another myth is one that portrays 
Hardenberg as a dreamer who is completely devoid of any grasp of reality. The 
pseudonym, Novalis, which Hardenberg used only four times in his life,3 serves as 
another distancing agent, turning the man into a persona. In this chapter, I disrupt these 
distancing agents in order to portray a more accurate picture of the "real" Friedrich von 
Hardenberg. 
Sophie 
 The common knowledge many have about Hardenberg is limited to very few 
aspects of his life. Anyone acquainted with his work from a literature course is certain to 
know that he died very young and that he developed a sudden infatuation for Sophie von 
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Kühn, who was twelve years old when their first meeting took place in November of 
1794, and that his infatuation with her pervaded his work and thoughts even after her 
death in March of 1797. There is a void of knowledge about Hardenberg’s biography 
before he met Sophie, and the period between Sophie’s death and that of Hardenberg's is 
thought to consist only of mourning and a longing for death so that he could be reunited 
with her. The real situation is much more complicated and is riddled with documented 
"concrete" events that even rival the myth that Sophie was the center of Hardenberg’s life 
while she was alive, let alone after her death. In order to examine this myth, looking at 
the period before their meeting is also relevant and reveals part of Hardenberg’s character 
while problematizing the religious aspect of their meeting. 
 Hardenberg began studying law at the age of nineteen in Leipzig, where he 
became acquainted with Friedrich Schlegel. The account of their meeting that Friedrich 
Schlegel gave his brother, August Wilhelm Schlegel, is one of admiration. He praised 
Hardenberg's enthusiasm and intellect and spoke of his desire to educate or mold the 
younger student: “[H]e speaks three times more and three times faster than we do–the 
quickest powers of comprehension and receptivity. The study of philosophy has given 
him a prodigal ease in the construction of fine philosophical thoughts. [...]. The 
relationship to one younger affords me a novel, voluptuous pleasure to which I 
surrender.”4 The relationship, which is portrayed in Schlegel's words as something 
intoxicating with a dynamic of power, leads to many flirtatious endeavors, for which the 
university in Leipzig was renown (Donehower 38). This then results in Hardenberg's 
nickname, “Fritz the Flirt.” This flirtatious aspect of Hardenberg’s university career was 
obviously well-known and was praised by Hardenberg himself in a religious fashion. He 
 
 10
referred to Schlegel as a “High Priest” and said: “Through you, I have learned to know 
heaven and hell–from you, I have partaken of the tree of knowledge" (Donehower 41). 
Even the end of a serious relationship with Juliane Eisenstuck, whom he met through 
Schlegel–who had been involved with Juliane's sister–did not disrupt his love of flirtation. 
Schlegel responded to the tone of Hardenberg’s letter in reaction to this event in the 
following manner: “I think you have incorrectly named your condition health [...]. To be 
sure you have suffered much as a result of her, but I hope that you will suffer even more. 
Only because I have always thought that the motivating goal of a richly promising talent 
cannot be the blithe state of a happy butterfly” (39). Hardenberg suffered as a result of 
the termination of his relationship with Juliane, but his suffering was mild and deemed 
healthy. Schlegel’s prescription of suffering in order to motivate talent is eerily far-
sighted considering the deaths that soon affected Hardenberg to such a great degree; 
however, the praise of flirtation as a religion would continue. Hardenberg wrote in a letter 
to his younger brother Erasmus: “Flirting is a charming but ticklish enterprise. May God 
in his goodness preserve one from ambition and the irresistible hankering to be the 
darling of any one girl” (42). These words were written at the beginning of November 
1794, the same month he subsequently met Sophie von Kühn.  
 The meeting with Sophie on November 17th was a life-changing moment 
according to Hardenberg, whose letter detailing the meeting unfortunately has been lost. 
The reaction to this letter from his brother Erasmus, however, was not. Erasmus, taking 
into consideration Hardenberg’s flirtatious escapades explains in a very sensitive and 
politely drawn-out manner, that he is the victim of passion, nothing more. After admitting 
that Hardenberg’s letter was astonishing and shocking (it said that he saw into Sophie‘s 
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heart in a quarter hour), Erasmus catalogues the effects that passion has on individuals: 
“When they are violent [passions], they rob us of the capacity for free thinking and action. 
[...] The suddenness, surprise, and overwhelming decisiveness mark this as a 
manifestation of passion. And wouldn’t such a passion be capable of blinding you in a 
moment?” (46). The second half of the letter is a plea for Hardenberg to consider his own 
past, of which no secrets had been kept between the brothers, when thinking about a 
marriage proposal to Sophie after their first encounter: “[Y]our soul [is] always hungry 
for new activities and accordingly used to change. Now, pay close attention!–In 
accordance with these premises, is it wise that your ever active spirit [...] should choose 
to settle its affections year-in-year-out on one single being?” (46-47). Erasmus obviously 
has in mind the words of Hardenberg’s letter that had been written at the beginning of the 
month. He then continues to speculate about what might happen if Hardenberg and 
Sophie actually marry, and turns Hardenberg’s words against him in a direct quote: 
“Finally, dearest Fritz, you yourself write: ‘as soon as I receive a general nod of favorable 
approval, the time of the blossoming of my inclination is past.’ Is it possible that you 
should not receive this nod of approval in answer to a girl who has given you her pledge” 
(47). Erasmus clearly believes that Hardenberg, overcome with unbridled passion, is 
overreacting to a “nod of approval” that he has gotten many times in the past and 
certainly will receive in the future. Pursuing this particular nod so forcefully, Erasmus 
fears, will lead to boredom, “the condition that you so long have dreaded” (48). 
 The allure that Sophie had for Hardenberg is explained by Arctander O'Brien in 
terms of his fear of realized sexual activity. O'Brien highlights the quotes in Hardenberg's 
correspondences about flirting and conceptualizes them in the term "absolute flirtation": 
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"Hardenberg posits happiness as the result of enjoying favor everywhere, while 
succumbing to its particulars nowhere. 'Everywhere and nowhere'–the future poet of the 
Absolute awakens as absolute flirt" (34). O'Brien points out Hardenberg's relief after his 
relationship with Juliane came to an end and cites how uncomfortable he was when 
flirting became seductive. Hardenberg wrote to Erasmus, for example, that he did not 
want to be the "darling of any one girl," but his discomfort, resulting from seduction, 
might keep him from being anyone's darling. Sophie provided the solution to this 
problem. Sexual activity with someone so young was out of the question, but flirtation in 
light of this deferral reached the absolute: "The perfect flirtation hovers at the ideal 
distance for the immediate delights of deliciously sustained deferral" (O'Brien 40). This 
interesting sexual dimension is a much more plausible reason for the allure that Sophie 
had for Hardenberg. Despite the praise that Hardenberg lavished upon Sophie, which 
O'Brien calls his most effective work of fiction (29), and contemporaries such as Ludwig 
Tieck, who had never met Sophie, among others, also praises her. Yet, Sophie's own 
journal paints a very different picture of the situation and remains the only preserved 
documentation of her personality. Some of the highlights that specifically mention 
Hardenberg are:   
 Jan. 7. Today Hardenb. rode away again early and again nothing much happened. 
 8. Today we were alone again and again nothing much happened. 
 9. Today we were alone again and again nothing much happened. 
 10. This morning a messenger came again from Sachsenburch [sic] and invited us 
 to meet father there the next day mother answered it. In the afternoon 
 Hardenberch [sic] came too. (Donehower 52) 
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These are typical of most of her journal entries. There is not even an entry for March 15th, 
the day Hardenberg proposed to her. The entries cited show her boredom and general 
disinterest in the affairs of daily life and in Hardenberg. They also dispel the notion that 
Hardenberg saw something in her beyond the attainment of absolute flirtation.  
 A character sketch about Sophie, entitled Klarisse, written by Hardenberg over a 
year after their secret engagement and two to three months after their official engagement, 
includes many sobering statements uncharacteristic of the persona of Novalis, someone 
allegedly feverishly infatuated with a young girl. This collection of short sentences is 
riddled with general compliments, such as, "[h]er decency and yet her innocent good 
nature" (quoted in Donehower 61), and, "[h]er spirit of observation. Love of children. 
Love of order" (62). Yet, his sobering statements, rather than pointing out merely minor 
faults, border on the horrific: "She won't let my affections bother her. My love often 
oppresses her. She is cold through and through" (62). Such observations serve to disrupt 
the idealization that is the hallmark of their relationship to outsiders and they also 
problematize Hardenberg’s writings about Sophie after her death, many of which have a 
religious tone, even setting her name side by side to the name Jesus. Though his writings 
about Sophie after her death frequently have a religious dimension, Hardenberg did not 
wait to unite with Sophie in the afterlife, rather he got engaged to Julie von Charpentier 
less than two years after Sophie’s death. His engagement to Julie, certainly calls the 
mythical aspect of his relationship with Sophie into question. It is either “an 
embarrassment, an inexplicable infidelity to a sacred love” (O‘Brien 66), or a humanizing 
aspect that brings Hardenberg down to earth. 
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Novalis the Persona 
 The pen-name Novalis is a distancing agent that has come to represent the 
mythical aspect of the man, Friedrich von Hardenberg, in a concrete way, and that 
appears on all of his writings still today. The name Novalis was derived from a thirteenth-
century relative of Hardenberg’s. Herr von Hardenberg started to call himself “von Rode” 
after the name of an estate that he had acquired. The Latin version of “von Rode” is “de 
Novali," meaning “one who clears new ground for cultivation" (Donehower 6).  
 Bruce Donehower points out that this designation reflects Hardenberg's ambitious 
nature as well as his view of the importance of his enterprise in inaugurating a new form 
of literature and thinking. The "ground" of thought up to that point had to be cleared so 
that this form of thinking could grow. Hardenberg viewed himself as one of the important 
agents in this deconstructive process of past traditions and also then as a pollinator of a 
new form of thought: “Such persons implicitly act as heralds of a new age or order, seed 
bearers, revolutionaries, or pioneers” (7). Pollinator is an appropriate term considering 
the opening lines of a collection of Novalis's philosophical fragments suitably entitled 
Pollen: “Freunde, der Boden ist arm, wir müssen reichlichen Samen / Ausstreun, dass uns 
doch nur mässige Ernten gedeihn.”5 
 The political slant to Hardenberg’s pseudonym is explored in more depth by 
O’Brien. The transformation of “de Novali” into “Novalis” carries with it political 
discretion. Many German writers, including Goethe and Schiller, added von to their 
names at the time when the Holy Roman Empire was issuing the final patents of nobility. 
Hardenberg replaced the old aristocratic de or von with the possessive s: “The slight 
change retained a quiet trace of Hardenberg’s lineage, but avoided the conspicuous 
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aristocracy and awkward parechesis of ‘von Novali’” (O’Brien 3). This change was 
symptomatic of the sensitivity with which Hardenberg wanted his writings to be 
approached during the Terror in the wake of the French Revolution. Hardenberg was 
walking a tightrope here between the reactionary aristocratic element in his pseudonym 
and the new revolutionary definition thereof. The destruction of the old that is made 
explicit in the definition of his chosen pseudonym would not be readily welcomed by all, 
but at least could be masked by maintaining the old and hinting at the new in this clever 
language play. 
The Divine Dreamer 
 For many, Hardenberg’s life also ended when Sophie died; thereafter he usually 
was only known by the pseudonym and in persona of Novalis. Friedrich von Hardenberg, 
the human being, is masked in the mystical intrigue of lost love and poetic signs. 
However, life for Hardenberg began years before he met Sophie and continued for him 
until March 25, 1801, the day of his death. It is what came after his death that fueled the 
myth of Novalis, the poet, the dreamer, the mystic, the non-person. Ludwig Tieck's 
biographical account, published with the third edition of Hardenberg’s works, is a 
primary source of the myth of Novalis, the persona, at the expense of Hardenberg, the 
man. Tieck commits the "cardinal error" mentioned above by Beiser by trying to equate 
Hardenberg with his literary works. The subject of Tieck’s “biographical account” is 
necessarily Novalis, not Hardenberg, and Tieck must have been fully aware of his 
construction, as is made clear by the title: Biography of Novalis. He mentions the name 
Friedrich von Hardenberg only once, even then putting Novalis in parenthesis. In the 
brief biographical information on Novalis before he meets Sophie, Tieck writes that his 
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spirit “seemed to awaken from a slumber” (Donehower 127) after overcoming a case of 
dysentery when he was nine years old. Despite Tieck’s assurance that Novalis did awake 
from his slumber, Hardenberg seems not to awake from a slumber in Tieck’s biography, a 
continuity which is made clear in his description of Hardenberg's death: “Toward nine 
o’clock he asked his brother [Karl] to play something for him on the piano, during which 
he fell asleep. Friedrich Schlegel came soon afterward into his room and found him very 
peacefully in slumber. [...] His usual friendly countenance looked unaltered, the same as 
if he were still alive” (134). Tieck constantly describes Novalis as a mythical being and 
even goes so far as to reify Hardenberg into a painting reflecting this tendency: “In 
profile and expression, his face closely resembled St. John the Evangelist, as we know 
that face from the lovely, large painting by Albrecht Dürer” (134). Novalis’s manner of 
speech also helps to create and perpetrate the view of his other-worldliness. When 
describing Novalis’s manner of conversation, Tieck asserts that he could reveal the 
depths of his soul “as though he were speaking under the sway of invisible worlds” (134). 
This eerie observation at best negates any human aspect of Novalis, and at worst makes 
one infer that Novalis was possessed by demons or some sort of spirit, depending on what 
one thinks of the “divine Dante,” to whom Tieck later compares Novalis.  
 August Cölestin Just wrote a contrasting biographical testimony ten years before 
Tieck. Just was very familiar with many aspects of Hardenbergs life, as he had met him 
in 1794 and witnessed his professional endeavors instead of being familiar only with his 
literary work, whereas Tieck did not meet Hardenberg until 1799 and knew only his 
literary life. Just’s biographical testimony refers to Hardenberg by his real name and 
professional position in the title: Friedrich von Hardenberg, Assessor of Salt Mines in 
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Saxony and Designated Department Director in Thuringia. This attempt to write 
something genuine about Hardenberg, the man, as opposed to Novalis, was met with a 
negative reaction from those who did not want the mythical aspect of Novalis to die with 
Hardenberg himself. One reader commented about Just’s approach in a letter to a friend: 
“[I]t makes a rather extraordinary and disturbing impression to think of Novalis as an 
official or director of a salt mine. That is horrible!!” (Donehower 3-4). But Just’s 
biography is not about Novalis. In fact, Just only mentioned Novalis once, when he 
referred to the edition of Hardenberg's writings that Schlegel and Tieck had published. 
He went on to add that “[o]ne would do him a disservice [...] to judge these [his writings] 
as fully rendered masterpieces or to read them as expressions of the entire human being” 
(Donehower 123). Tieck’s biography of Novalis in 1815 is a disservice, pandering to the 
marketability of a mythical figure. In contrast, Just’s biography is a testament to the 
genius of Hardenberg, which Just defines as:   
 [The person possessing] outstanding spiritual abilities to learn every science 
 easily, to penetrate a subject to its depths, to seize upon it with certainty, order it 
 with wisdom, and judge it with the soundest critical faculties; he possesses these 
 same strengths in all his spiritual faculties, the same ease in directing these 
 strengths and abilities toward this or that object, and the same joy and love in their 
 employment. (111) 
 Just describes many aspects of Hardenberg's genius: his skill as an administrator; 
his ability to read quickly and still recall every detail of what he had read months later; 
his interests in human rights and the state; and his ambitious plan to unify all arts and 
sciences. Just, however, does not praise Hardenberg’s personal qualities and professional 
 
 18
life at the expense of his relationship with Sophie. The slant that Just takes on the 
relationship with Sophie emphasizes Hardenberg’s steadfast capacity to reason, his 
intellectual industriousness, and even his humor. For example, Sophie’s illness gave 
Hardenberg the motive to familiarize himself with medicine and healing; his productivity 
in writing continued despite this hard time, and Just mentions a humorous poem on the 
subject of purchasing a garden. One section reads: “Sie sprach so sanft: / ‘Verdammt, 
Mann! / Ein jedes hat allhier so einen Gartenfleck, / Und wir – was haben wir? – wir 
haben einen – / Es ist nicht auszustehn, wo soll ich Kaffee trinken?”6 
 The effectiveness of Tieck’s account of Novalis, as opposed to Just’s testimony of 
Hardenberg, is evident in the essay of another famous German writer: Heinrich Heine. In 
The Romantic School, Heine strikes a parallel between Novalis and the girl who 
introduced Novalis to him, whose name, coincidently, was Sophia. He met her as she was 
reading Heinrich von Afterdingen, the book that Heine says gave her tuberculosis. The 
myth of Sophie is also transposed over the life of Sophia, who takes on angelic qualities 
as she nears death: “[S]he was now of a spiritual beauty and sight of which moved me 
most grievously. [...] [I] finally asked, ‘Mademoiselle Sophia, how are you?’ ‘I am well,’ 
she answered, ‘and shall soon be even better.’ And she pointed out the window to the 
new graveyard” (80). Sophia bequeathed Heinrich von Afterdingen to Heine after her 
morbid longing for death was granted. Whether she succumbed to the Novalis myth 
herself, or rather was the victim of Heine’s imagination and propagation of the myth is 
not clear.  
 Hardenberg does not lose any appeal as a man, writer, scientist, or philosopher, 
even after one examines the myths that surround him. On the contrary, his true genius 
 
 19
emerges: he is not part of a divine being, but rather has an astounding capacity for 
knowledge and competency in a variety of fields. This expanded view of Hardenberg, 
which goes beyond the mythical aspects of Novalis, will support my further examination 
of Hardenberg's philosophy and theories and will help contextualize his work and give it 
more depth. 
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FICHTESIEREN 
  
 One of the fields of knowledge that Hardenberg took a great interest in was the 
philosophical studies of his time. He, and many others in the Jena circle, most notably 
Friedrich Schlegel, was largely influenced by J.G. Fichte. In October, 1795, Hardenberg 
began his ambitious philosophical work, Fichte Studies, written in response to Fichte’s 
Science of Knowledge.1 He completed it almost a year later in September of 1796.2 
During this time period and well after, Hardenberg engaged in discussions about Fichte’s 
philosophy with F. Schlegel in a process they termed, fichtesieren or “fichtecizing.” 
Fichtecizing does not by any means denote a "herd/master" discussion of a contemporary 
philosopher, but rather entails an analytical approach to Fichte meant to inspire new ideas 
that go beyond the master: “[It] hints at an ironic mimicry that does more than imitate. 
Fichtecizing implies not only identification, but distance, and Hardenberg himself uses 
the word in both senses” (O’Brien 82). Hardenberg uses Science of Knowledge as a point 
of departure to introduce what he felt was left out or glossed over in Fichte’s work. The 
result is a complicated theory that plays with Fichte’s propositions, while also trying to 
appropriate and simultaneously distance itself from it, which has parallels to 
contemporary, twentieth-century critical schools, such as deconstructionism and the 
poststructuralism of Jacques Lacan. It also demonstrates the path toward personal 
development in a social manner at odds with the narcissistic labeling that characterizes 
many Romantic texts. 
 Fichte begins Science of Knowledge with the fundamental proposition of self-
positing, expressed as A = A, or I am I. The self posits itself absolutely in an original act 
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(Tathandlung): “The self’s own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity. The self 
posits itself, and by virtue of this mere self-assertion it exists” (Fichte 83). The self is a 
unity according to Fichte. Thus, A=A entails the absolute positing of opposites as well as 
the absolute positing of the self: "Every opposite, so far as it is so, is so absolutely, by 
virtue of an act of the self, and for no other reason. Opposition in general is posited 
absolutely by the self" (103). Fichte's theory does not leave room for anything outside of 
the self, since the self is an absolute sphere. Hardenberg critiques this notion in his Fichte 
Studies and asks the question: "Has not Fichte too arbitrarily packed everything into the 
I?" (FS 7).  
 According to Hardenberg, the "subject itself is always already split into self and 
other."3 "In order to determine the I we must refer it to something. Reference occurs 
through differentiation – Both [occur] through the thesis of an absolute sphere of 
existence. This is mere-being – or chaos" (FS 6). For Hardenberg, it is impossible for the 
I to contain the other within it absolutely, since the I can only be distinguished in 
reference to something else, i.e. the non-I. He does, however, retain Fichte's notion of the 
self as an act. The I and non-I are encompassed by an absolute sphere which Hardenberg 
calls "chaos" or "God": "The act by which the I posits itself as I must be connected with 
the antithesis of an independent Non-I and of the relationship to a sphere that 
encompasses them – this sphere can be called God, and I" (FS 7). The self is not a unity, 
rather a relationship between the I, the non-I, and the absolute sphere, making otherness 
central to subjectivity (Mittman 50).  
 Hardenberg uses paradoxical logic to describe the relationship between the I, the 
non-I, and the Absolute: "Consciousness is a being outside of being that is within being 
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[…] What is outside being must not be a proper being. An improper being outside being 
is an image – So what is outside being must be an image of being within being. 
Consciousness is consequently an image of being within being" (5). He goes on to 
formulate a theory of signs and representation central to his rethinking of A=A that is 
similar to the mirror stage in Lacanian theory. Azade Seyhan highlights the visual aspect 
in Hardenberg's theory of the self by pointing out that an eye is needed for the 
representation of the I.4 If the other is an "image of being within being," one would have 
to be able to see this image and have it reflect back on the I, or eye, as with a mirror. In 
this fashion, the Self is conscious of the non-I and of its own self-positing as a 
representation of an image. The I is only aware of itself as distinct from the Non-I 
because of the image which the I creates, meaning: "[T]he I is as much other, or Non-I, as 
it is I" (Mittman 50). The tension between the I and the Non-I, one of continual dividing 
and uniting, shows the displacement or flux of the subject. The subject is in a constant 
state of hovering, or schweben, between the I and the Non-I. The Self is found in this act 
of relating in the relationship between the I and the Non-I, which both are encompassed 
by an absolute sphere. 
 The absolute sphere cannot be fully comprehended by the subject. As noted above, 
Hardenberg describes it as "God" or "chaos." Chaos is indifference, a sphere without 
differentiation and therefore without opposites, and yet paradoxically, it is also a sphere 
where the difference between the I and the Non-I are maintained. The absolute sphere, in 
so far as it can be comprehended by the subject, is also in a state of flux as the Self relates 
to it. The Absolute can only be understood negatively, meaning the Self can only define 
the Absolute by what the Self is not. It is not presentable in a positive sense.  
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 The Self longs to attain the absolute, a realm beyond differentiation. The Self is 
suspended between the limitation and definition of self as distinct from the Non-I and the 
Absolute, which remains the potential development of the Self: "[W]e only know the self, 
be its name Ego or God, insofar as we know the Self, and we only know the self insofar 
as the subject reflects the object and vice versa"5 as Géza von Molnár says it. The 
appropriation of the Absolute is the goal of self-development. The pure activity of the 
Self in suspension between the Non-I and its relation to the absolute sphere is itself the 
attainment of the Absolute. O'Brien formulates this as follows:  
 One gains entrance to the Absolute only through the back door, that is, one 
 'attains' it, ironically, by renouncing it–and finding out that one 'already' had it 
 in the activity of seeking and renouncing it. To 'attain' the Absolute means merely 
 to recognize that one already operates in accordance with it–the Absolute is not 
 the goal, but the principle of our activity. (115) 
The Non-I, in addition to being a limiter to the Self, plays an important role as a 
conductor to the Absolute (Molnár 66). The Non-I possesses this revelatory function in 
Hardenberg's theory of love, or that of the subject becoming object. In his theory of love, 
the Non-I is given a new designation: You. The transformation of the Non-I into the You, 
or the process of the subject becoming object sounds like a narcissistic concept, one in 
which the subject mistakes the other for himself.  
 In his psychoanalytic study of Hardenberg entitled Fatherland,6 Kenneth Calhoon 
echoes this charge using as his example Heinrich and Mathilde’s relationship in Heinrich 
von Afterdingen when Heinrich talks about being the mirror of Mathilde’s being: 
“Mathilde’s prominence as the ultimate narcissistic object is betrayed by the imagery 
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Heinrich employs to describe their affinity [...] Heinrich has placed himself in the 
position not of Narcissus, but of his reflection–a reversal that simply underscores the 
view that confusion of the self for an Other is the essence of narcissism” (Calhoon 82). 
Heinrich and Mathilde's relationship is a representation of a perfect love, of the 
transformation into the You, which I will discuss in more depth in the analysis of 
Heinrich von Afterdingen; it is not a representation of narcissism. This view7 is held by 
James R. Hodkinson in his study on women and writing in Hardenberg. He explains that 
the You does not demonstrate a “narcissistic illusion of inter-subjectivity“ (141), but 
rather an “ethically sound attempt to rethink radical subjectivity” (140). It was made clear 
above that Hardenberg makes otherness central to subjectivity. His fundamental critique 
of Fichte’s I=I is that Fichte put too much into the I. Hardenberg contends that the Self 
hovers between the I and the Non-I, or Other–an Other which is outside of the Self–but 
remains fundamental to self-consciousness as “an image of being within being” (FS 5). A 
passage from the Allgemeine Brouillon8 defends Hodkinson’s position regarding 
Hardenberg’s rethinking of subjectivity:  
 We now behold the true bindings connecting subject and object–behold that there 
 is also an external world within us, united in an analogous manner with our 
 internal being, just as the external world outside us is united with our external 
 being; and hence the former and latter are joined, like our internal and external 
 realms. (AB 151) 
The You is not an interaction limited to the Self, but includes the internal world as well as 
the external world within the subject, since otherness is central to subjectivity. 
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Hardenberg echoes this passage in another passage in the Allgemeine Brouillon that 
contains his theory of love:  
 Nature will become moral–when out of a genuine love of art–it devotes itself to 
 art–does what art wishes–and when art, through a genuine love of Nature–lives 
 for Nature, works in accordance with Nature. Thus both must act at the same 
 time, out of their own choice–and for their own sakes–and out of this foreign 
 choice for the sake of the other. They must encounter the other in themselves, and 
 themselves in the other. (AB 12) 
Nature and art in this passage can just as well be read as Self and Other. Art being the 
creation of the Self, and Nature being the external world. The free agency required of 
both Self and Other to transform into the You is highlighted by the word “choice.” 
Genuine love is not the Self or Other working for itself, but rather each using their 
individual free agency as objects external to each other to encounter each other and form 
a union. Hardenberg’s concept of the You and the transformation of the Self and Other 
into the You carries with it social and ethical implications. The Self is not narcissistic. It 
longs for self-fulfillment and the approximation of unity with the absolute sphere through 
the appropriation of others, which in turn redraws the circumference of the absolute 
sphere as it expands. These Others are external to the Self, but also part of the subject. 
The You is the closest approximation of unity between the I, the Non-I, and the Absolute. 
To achieve unity, the Self cannot act alone, but must leave itself open to the free agency 
of the Other. 
 The Self is then pure activity in which the I becomes conscious through the 
representation of itself as opposed to an Other, or Non-I. The subject is in a constant state 
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of hovering, or schweben, between the I and the Non-I. The I longs to be united with the 
Non-I and the Absolute, both of which are beyond the realm of knowledge of the subject. 
The subject distinguishes itself from the Absolute in a negative relation, but attempts to 
replicate their unity through the appropriation of Others and of experiences. This causes 
the circumference of the absolute sphere to be redrawn and expand as the realm of 
consciousness of the subject expands. Hardenberg’s inclusion of otherness as central to 
subjectivity gives his philosophy a social aspect in that the self desires a close connection 
with others, dispelling any preconceived notion that people are not social beings in 
Hardenberg’s philosophy. 
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KARL MARX AND ALIENATION 
 
 The early writings of Karl Marx, especially the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts,1 are also a useful tool in interpreting Hardenberg’s work. The contrasts 
between the two philosophers are great and fundamental. In fact, it would be difficult to 
imagine two figures whose personas are at such odds as Novalis and Marx: Novalis, his 
face as innocent as a child's and radiant like an angel's, longing to leave the confines of 
the earth in order to experience a fuller life in spirit with his lost love Sophie; and Marx 
uniting workers with grease-stains on their uniforms to fight against the dominant power 
structure underneath every major industrial center in the world, all of which look like the 
set of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis. In other ways, however, the two men are very much alike: 
both are concerned with the full development of individuals, and both formulated explicit 
social theories on how to achieve this goal. Highlighting the social aspect of 
Hardenberg's ideas, as well as some of Marx's will give the reader further insight into 
Hardenberg's work, specifically into Heinrich von Afterdingen. 
 There are many essential differences between Marx and Hardenberg, the greater 
of which lies in their basic approach to their respective philosophies. Hardenberg writes 
in abstractions. He writes about potential unities and an absolute sphere. These 
abstractions are frequently presented in contradictory terms in which tension governs 
their relations. The absolute sphere, for example, is a realm in which all oppositions 
disappear, but also a realm, in which the oppositions between Self and Other are held 
separate. Such a use of abstractions has fed into the mythical representation of 
Hardenberg as Novalis. Marx, on the other hand, avoids abstractions in order to study 
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human beings in their concrete, or material, social setting. He looks upon his endeavor as 
a natural scientific enterprise, where notions that cannot be proved empirically are not 
helpful, but rather constitute illusions, which he portrays as being negative. Marx’s 
critique of the Young Hegelians in German Ideology,2 which reduces their efforts to the 
status of word-games, fits very well into a critique of Hardenberg, also an idealist: “They 
forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, 
and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely 
combating the phrases of this world” (41). After a brief discussion of the most important 
theory in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, alienation, I will demonstrate 
that there are similarities between Marx's and Hardenberg's thought, and that these are 
useful in illuminating their work.  
 Alienation is a complicated concept with far-reaching implications for humankind, 
in its relationship to objects of production, nature, and other people. Erich Fromm gives a 
concise definition of alienation in the introduction to Marx’s Concept of Man:  
 Alienation (or “estrangement“) means, for Marx, that man does not experience 
 himself as the acting agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, 
 others, and he himself) remain alien to him. They stand above and against him as 
 objects, even though they may be objects of his own creation. Alienation is 
 essentially experiencing the world and oneself passively, receptively, as the 
 subject separated from the object.3 
Marx frames his discussion of alienation in three categories: man’s alienation from the 
product of his labor, man’s alienation within labor to the act of production, and man’s 
alienation from nature, which is also shown to be his alienation from other men.  
 
 31
 Marx gives two examples for how the object of labor is turned into an external 
alien and hostile force to the worker. He first compares this to the relationship between 
man and God, writing that the “more of himself man attributes to God the less he has left 
in himself” (EPM 80). The worker expends his energy to make a product that is external 
to himself. The more energy he expends in his labor, the less he belongs to himself. The 
second example is man’s relationship to nature. Nature provides man with a means of 
existence in two ways: first, it provides the objects that make labor possible and then also 
provides the means of existence for the worker. Appropriating man's means of existence 
through labor in fact deprives him of his means of existence: “[T]he sensuous external 
world becomes progressively less an object belonging to his labor or a means of existence 
of his labor, and [...] it becomes progressively less a means of existence in the direct 
sense, a means for the physical subsistence of the worker” (80-81). Being a worker and a 
subject are intertwined in such a way that one cannot exist without the other. 
 Second, man is also alienated through the act of production itself. Marx calls this 
active alienation. The worker’s labor is also external and opposed to the worker in that 
the labor exhausts the worker mentally and physically, keeps the worker from feeling at 
home when working, and only indirectly satisfies his needs, that is, it is a means through 
which he can satisfy his needs. Labor is also external to the worker, because it does not 
belong to him since he works for someone else. The work is forced, not voluntary. The 
result is that the worker becomes an animal and the animal becomes a worker: “[M]an 
(the worker) feels himself to be freely active only in his animal functions–eating, 
drinking and procreating, or at most also in his dwelling and in personal adornment–
while in his human functions he is reduced to an animal” (82). Marx goes on to explain 
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that although the above activities are also human, they are mere abstractions outside of 
the context of other human activities. 
 Alienation from nature and from other men is the result of the reversal of the 
means and ends of human activity. A man’s conscious life activity, his being, which 
separates man from animals, becomes a means for his existence. Man is alienated from 
his being since the object of his production, nature, or species life, is external to his being 
rather than being objectified through labor: “The object of labor is therefore, the 
objectification of man‘s species life; for he no longer reproduces himself merely 
intellectually, as in consciousness, but actively and in a real sense, and he sees his own 
reflection in a world which he has constructed“ (84). The similarity of this idea with the 
conscious subject as seen in Hardenberg's work is unmistakable. Man distinguishes 
himself as an image reflecting off of the Other, as in a mirror. The alienation from nature 
and oneself in conscious activity also  results in alienation from other men. Man does not 
live alone, but with other men. It follows then that if man is alienated from his own being 
in the reversal of his conscious life activity, he is also alienated from other beings, whose 
activity is also reversed.  
 Alienation has an effect on the senses, in much the same way that it affects the 
relationships between man and product, activity, nature, and other men. There is a 
difference between human sense, the human ear for example, and crude senses. In order 
for people to employ their senses as human beings, instead of as animals–in the case of 
crude senses–the object of the senses must be a social one; man must be a social being, 
and society must become a being in the object. The senses operate in their human form 
when the subject becomes the object:  
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 [I]t is only when objective reality everywhere becomes for man in society the 
 reality of human faculties, human reality, and thus the reality of his own faculties, 
 that all objects become for him the objectification of himself. The objects then 
 confirm and realize his individuality, they are his own objects, i.e., man himself 
 becomes the object. (EPM 108) 
This passage sounds much like Hardenberg when he speaks of love and the 
transformation of the object and subject into a You. This is the condition in which the 
subject is most fully developed and closest to the absolute sphere. This condition is 
contrasted by Marx with the condition of animals who are alienated and unconscious of 
their social activity in nature. For Marx, a starving man performs his natural functions, 
for example, eating, as would an animal. The object of this function, food, is enjoyed by 
him only in an abstract form. He cannot appreciate the true beauty and taste of it, because 
the food is not a human object. The less alienated a person is, the more effective the 
senses are.  
 There are many passages in Marx that show trains of thought similar to 
Hardenberg. While critiquing Hegel, Marx uses language similar to Hardenberg's in his 
critique of Fichte: “A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural 
being [...]. A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A being 
which is not itself an object for a third being has no being for its object” (EPM 141). This 
could just as well be a critique of I=I in Fichte‘s Wissenschaftlehre, which, as discussed 
above, Hardenberg wanted to go beyond, because he felt that Fichte put too much into the 
I. Both Hardenberg and Marx insist on an object, a Non-I, external to the I. They both 
also insist on the subject becoming the object in order for the full development of 
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individuals to take place. Erich Fromm uses this relationship between the subject and 
object to interpret Marx’s theory of love. He states in Marx's Concept of Man that, in love, 
subject and object cannot be separated (28). Hardenberg’s theory of love is identical. 
Even though Hardenberg speaks in abstractions, such as the Absolute, and Marx focuses 
on man’s material social relations, they both come to the same conclusions. The theories 
of Marx and Hardenberg inform each other, if on different planes and with different ideas 
of material existence, all of which, however, relate together in interpretation. This 
relationship informs the following discussion of Heinrich von Afterdingen. 
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HEINRICH VON AFTERDINGEN: DEPARTURE FROM HOME 
 
 In the following discussion, I interpret Hardenberg’s major work of fiction, 
Heinrich von Afterdingen, as a narrative of self-development, in a general sense, 
following Hardenberg's theories. It could be interpreted as the story of the development 
of a gifted poet, although the universality of the work is not best served by this 
interpretation, which is also flawed in that Heinrich, the main character, does not 
compose a single poem in the plot, even though he often muses on the subject. 
Admittedly, the author includes much in the work to invite such an interpretation, but 
poetry is described in very universal terms in Afterdingen, whose message should not be 
limited to composers of verse. Various myths concerning Novalis, which I will point out 
throughout this discussion, are also suggestively written into the text by Hardenberg. Yet, 
Afterdingen, being a work of fiction, should not necessitate a reenvisioning of its author, 
no matter how prevalent the myths are.  
 The focus of my interpretation is the social aspect of Afterdingen, specifically in 
the context of Karl Marx's early works. The esoteric writing in Afterdingen often 
conceals the material and social aspects discussed in the work. The goal of this study is 
not to devalue one aspect in favor of the other, but rather to show that the theories of 
Hardenberg and Marx are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that they inform each 
other in their goal of societal and self-development. Already the dedication, which 
introduces Afterdingen, highlights its social aspects. The first word of the dedication is du, 
signaling a familiar, and trusting social relationship. The remainder of the work tells the 
 
 37
tale of a youth becoming a nonalienated, social being, not the tale of a lonely, wandering 
poet striving to live for himself outside of and parallel to society.  
 The spelling of Afterdingen used in this discussion keeps in spirit with my attempt 
to distinguish between Novalis and Hardenberg. Hardenberg never used the spelling, 
Ofterdingen, which was a change made by the editors of the first publishing of the work 
after his death. O’Brien points out that Afterdingen has a political reference to Afterding, 
a term for the Franconian judicial assembly in the middle ages (15), which has its roots in 
the traditional Germanic assembly (das Ding). 
 Afterdingen1 begins with, or has its false beginning, with the narrator's discussion 
of an encounter with a stranger, as well as Heinrich's dream. Heinrich distinguishes the 
mysterious world of the stranger, which is what caused Heinrich to dream in the first 
place, from the material world in which Heinrich lives. Heinrich is immersed in thought 
about the stories the stranger told him, especially about what the stranger said about the 
blue flower, whose reference is highlighted above all by Heinrich’s use of a definite 
article. The distinguishing factor between the two worlds is sensual alienation: “[I]n der 
Welt, in der ich sonst lebte, wer hätte da sich um Blumen bekümmert, und gar von einer 
so seltsamen Leidenschaft für eine Blume hab ich damals nie gehört” (9) (“In the world 
where I had always lived, who ever bothered about flowers? Besides, such a strange 
passion for a flower is something I never heard of before”).2 The mysterious world is a 
foreign concept to Heinrich, which can only be approximated in his dreams. The mention 
of this world, where people do care about flowers, is a foreshadowing of the world of 
which Heinrich eventually will become a part. The beginning sentences are displaced as 
an actual beginning in two ways. First, the beginning–Heinrich contemplating by 
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himself–is predicated on an earlier beginning which remains mysterious, that of the 
stranger's origin. Second, the beginning is also the end; it is a speculation of a world 
devoid of alienation. The dream-world that Heinrich perceives in his dream is the kind of 
world that he will inhabit in the unfinished second part of Afterdingen. 
 Heinrich's dream, inspired by the stranger's stories, is a foreshadowing of future 
events in Afterdingen as well as a symbol of his birth, underscoring the universality of the 
work. Afterdingen is the story of a life, and the dream is the birth sequence. In his 
psychoanalytic interpretation of Afterdingen, Calhoon points out that the cave which 
Heinrich enters is described much like a womb (78). The walls of the cave are moist, and 
there is a pool in the center of the chamber in which Heinrich has an irresistible urge to 
bath. He leaves the cave by means of a stream connected to the pool. After a slumber 
within his dream, Heinrich finds himself in a field during a curious time of day. Night 
and day are combined in the description of the sky at this particular time: "[D]as 
Tageslicht das ihn umgab, war heller und milder als das gewöhnliche, der Himmel war 
schwarzblau und völlig rein" (11) ("[T]he daylight round about him was brighter and 
milder than ordinary daylight, and the sky was dark blue and wholly clear" [17]). This 
strange mixture of light and dark in the description of the sky is typical of Hardenberg's 
writing, in which he dispels traditional oppositions in favor of blends that approximate 
unity. Heinrich's disrupted focus at this point in the dream is also highlighted in this 
description. Heinrich focuses on one particular thing in the field: the blue flower.  
 The blue flower is drawn to Heinrich, just as he is drawn to it. At the end of the 
dream, Heinrich also sees a girl's face in the flower, which he will recognize later as his 
love, Mathilde. The blue flower, which has become a symbol of longing referred to by 
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contemporary scholars (Calhoon, Seyhan, Hodkinson) for the entire Early German 
Romantic movement, has been interpreted many ways in Heinrich's dream and 
throughout the novel where it appears. Calhoon interprets the blue flower as a symbol of 
auto-eroticism and an act of self-creation (6). The flower's stem grows as the petals 
become shinier (Afterdingen 11). This idea of self-creation fits into Hodkinson's 
interpretation of the blue flower as representing the Non-I or You. Heinrich objectifies 
himself through reflection on the Non-I (Hodkinson 173), which for Henrich is Mathilde, 
and for his father it is Heinrich's mother. The blue flower can be interpreted in so many 
different ways that Alice Kuzniar's comment that the flower is uninterpretable because it 
has a false origin, in that it came from the stranger3 could prove to be correct. It is 
displaced as a symbol. However, instead of giving up trying to interpret this persistent 
image in Afterdingen, it can be interpreted as the social determination of Heinrich's 
unconscious. Heinrich does not feel the same after hearing about the flower from the 
stranger, and the face that he sees in the flower at the end of his dream he later identifies 
with Mathilde. Thus the objectification of his Self through reflection on the Other 
demonstrates the social nature of Hardenberg's philosophy, where otherness is central to 
subjectivity. Heinrich's longing for the blue flower and its reciprocal response towards 
Heinrich both demonstrate the natural longing of humans for social relationships, echoing 
Marx's claim that humans are by nature social beings. That humans are social beings and 
are conscious of their relations with other humans, is what separates humans from 
animals, who are not conscious of the relating in their relations with other animals (GI 
51). Heinrich’s dream is the perfect occasion to demonstrate his conscious social nature, 
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since dreams are a window into the unconscious, the realm that holds one’s deepest 
longings. 
 Heinrich is awoken by his mother and the monotonous realities of everyday–in 
that his father scolds him for sleeping too late and not helping him work. Heinrich 
counters his father's position with a description of his curious dream, but his father has a 
different opinion of the meaning of dreams:  
 Träume sind Schäume […]. Die Zeiten sind nicht mehr, wo zu den Träumen 
 göttliche Gesichte sich gesellten, und wir können es nicht begreifen, wie es jenen 
 auserwählten Männern, von denen die Bibel erzählt, zumute gewesen ist. Damals 
 muss es eine andere Beschaffenheit mit den Träumen gehabt haben, so wie mit 
 den menschlichen Dingen. (12) 
 (Dreams are spindrift [...]. The times are past when divine apparitions appeared in 
 dreams, and we cannot and will not fathom the state of mind of those chosen men 
 the Bible speaks of. The nature of dreams as well as of the world of men must 
 have been different in those days. [18]) 
Heinrich's father, much like Hardenberg by means of the novel, romanticizes the past to 
suggest that dreams were more meaningful then, that they were even divine messages. 
Dreams have since lost their importance because "[i]n dem Alter der Welt, wo wir leben, 
findet der unmittelbare Verkehr mit dem Himmel nicht mehr statt" (13) ("In the age we 
live in there is no longer any direct intercourse with heaven" [18]). Dreams are no longer 
meaningful for Heinrich's father, because they have no practical purpose. If one cannot 
communicate with a divine realm and receive revelations relevant to material existence 
through dreams, their importance is confined to the subjective whims of fantasy. Heinrich 
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attempts to assign a meaning to dreams in defense against his father: "Mich dünkt der 
Traum eine Schutzwehr gegen die Regelmäßigkeit und Gewöhnlichkeit des Lebens" (13) 
("Dreams seem to me to be a defense against the regularity and routine of life" [19]). 
 Here, Heinrich is using what Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre call "critical 
irrealism" to show his father that dreams can be meaningful against the regularity and the 
ordinary of their contemporary time. Critical irrealism "designate[s] the opposition 
between a marvelous, imaginary, ideal, utopian world and the gray, prosaic, inhuman 
reality of the modern world. Even when it takes the superficial form of a flight from 
reality, this critical irrealism can contain a powerful implicit or explicit negative charge 
challenging the philistine bourgeois order."4 Heinrich's dream is, therefore, not a form of 
escapism alienating him from his material existence, but rather a means by which he can 
criticize his material existence, recognizing that it is incomplete, in that it does not allow 
for his full development. Heinrich's father seems to be touched by his son's defense of 
dreams, and after some prodding, tells about a dream of his own, which is remarkably 
similar to his son's dream. He too dreamt of a cave and ended up in a field where his 
attention was drawn to a certain flower, whose color he cannot recall. His guide in the 
dream tells him that he has seen "das Wunder der Welt" (17) ("the greatest wonder of the 
world" [22]). The guide also says that if the meaning of the dream was revealed to him, 
he would be blessed with "das höchste irdische Los" (17) ("the highest earthly lot" [22]). 
After this part of the dream, Heinrich's father dreams that he sees his wife holding a child 
that takes on divine properties, growing radiant and beginning to fly overhead. 
Interpreting this child to be Heinrich invites a mythological reading of the rest of the 
work. The “highest earthly lot" could actually signify Heinrich‘s future treasure after he 
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finds the blue flower and its meaning in his life. If this is so, one would expect that 
Heinrich would transform into a supernatural being by the end of the novel. This is 
consistent with the view of Hardenberg as a divine dreamer with little interest in the 
material world. However, it must be noted that the guide‘s promised treasure is confined 
to the earth even though the meaning of the dream is revelatory. The symbolic dream-
language of the unconscious cannot be confused with its implications for material 
existence. The blue flower continues to represent the social nature of man in Heinrich's 
father's dream. The recognized ideal of social relationships, the You or the subject 
transforming into object and vice versa, is part of self-fulfillment. This ideal, with its 
material implications, is precisely what is represented symbolically in both Heinrich‘s 
and his father‘s dream. 
 When Heinrich is twenty, he and his mother leave home in order to visit 
Heinrich‘s grandfather, whom Heinrich had never met, in Augsburg. They depart with a 
group of merchants, who are going to Augsburg on business. The narrator prefaces the 
conversation between Heinrich and the merchants with an idealization of Heinrich‘s time 
as a critique of the modern world in which the narrator lives. The narrator speaks of the 
"idyllic poverty" of Heinrich‘s age, which affects the relationship of the senses of those 
in poverty with objects and the outside world: 
 Eine liebliche Armut schmückte diese Zeiten mit einer eigentümlichen ernsten 
 und unschuldigen Einfalt; und die sparsam verteilten Kleinodien glänzten desto 
 bedeutender in dieser Dämmerung, und erfüllten ein sinniges Gemüt mit 
 wunderbaren Erwartungen. Wenn es wahr ist, dass erst eine geschickte Verteilung 
 von Licht, Farbe und Schatten die verborgene Herrlichkeit der sichtbaren Welt 
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 offenbart, und sich hier ein neues höheres Auge aufzutun scheint: so war damals 
 überall eine ähnliche Verteilung und Wirtschaftlichkeit wahrzunehmen; da 
 hingegen die neuere wohlhabendere Zeit das einförmige und unbedeutendere Bild 
 eines allgemeinen Tages darbietet. (19) 
 (An idyllic poverty adorned those times with a peculiarly earnest and innocent 
 simplicity; and in that semidarkness these treasures gleamed all the more 
 significantly for being sparingly distributed, and they filled the thoughtful heart 
 with wondrous hopes. If it is true that only a skillful distribution of light, color, 
 and shadow reveals the hidden glory of the visible world and that a new and 
 higher kind of eye appears to open here, there was likewise to be considered at 
 that time a similar distribution and economy everywhere; whereas the more 
 prosperous modern age presents the monotonous and more humdrum picture of a 
 commonplace day. [25]) 
The idealization of the past in this passage and in Heinrich's father's critique of the 
meaning of dreams calls the meaning of past into question. If any past can be idealized, 
the same conditions which are being praised can also be realized in the present since the 
present is a future past. Dreams do not have to be meaningless in Heinrich's time, and the 
idyllic poverty of that same period can exist in the narrator's contemporary time. The 
idealization of the past in Afterdingen is a critique of the present, or of any period, in 
which the ideals are lacking, but in which these ideals can be realized in the future. 
  In the above passage, the narrator refers to a "higher kind of eye" in opposition to 
the regularity of everyday life. This corresponds to the human eye versus the crude eye as 
presented in Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. The description of sight in 
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Afterdingen is developed human sight, where the objects are not alienated. The word 
geschickt, or skillful, is telling, in that it demonstrates the difficulty of realizing 
developed human senses as opposed to crude senses. Human senses are not a given. They 
need to be cultivated. They are the result of skillful processes, which humans themselves 
are responsible for undertaking. Hardenberg refers to his own role as the artist or author 
of Afterdingen, by referring to skillful processes in terms of the "distribution of light, 
color and shadow." This distribution is determined by nature, which humans cannot 
affect, but in referring to his own role of representation in the novel, Hardenberg hints at 
the active role that humans play in the cultivation of their senses. Outside of the novel, it 
is the human senses that perceive nature.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45
Notes 
                                                 
  
 1 Novalis, Heinrich von Ofterdingen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2004). All German  
 
quotes are from this edition. 
 
 2 Novalis, Henry von Ofterdingen, trans. Palmer Hilty (Prospect Heights:  
 
Waveland P, 1990) 15. All English quotes are from this translation. 
 
 3 Alice A Kuzniar, Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in Novalis and Hölderlin  
 
(Athens: U of Georgia P, 1987) 107. 
 
 4 Micheael Löwy  and Robert Sayre, Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity,  
 
trans. Catherine Porter (Durham: Duke UP, 2001) 12. 
 
 
 
 46
THE MERCHANTS AND THEIR STORIES 
 
 The merchants with whom Heinrich and his mother travel begin to praise 
Augsburg as an ideal place to live. People are prosperous there in a variety of trades 
including the arts. After hard work during the day, the people of Augsburg have time to 
enjoy leisure activities such as social gatherings and artistic endeavors. Despite the 
rhetoric of the merchants in describing Augsburg as a haven for artists, they themselves 
possess little to no knowledge of the arts, having neglected them because of arts' 
supposed lack of practicality. This neglect is also shown in the merchant's disagreement 
with Heinrich over the value of spiritual matters when they discuss Heinrich’s chaplain. 
Heinrich defends the chaplain’s occupation with the spiritual realm as a defense against 
the monotony of everyday life: “[S]ollte nicht jene höhere Kunde ebenfalls geschickt 
machen, recht unparteiisch dem Zügel menschlicher angelegenheiten zu führen? sollte 
nicht jene kindliche unbefangene Einfalt sicherer den richtigen Weg durch das Labyrinth 
der hiesigen Begebenheiten treffen” (24) ("[s]hould not that higher knowledge likewise 
impart skill in guiding quite impartially the reins of human affairs? Should not that 
detached childlike simplicity hit upon the right path through the labyrinth of our mundane 
affairs” [29]). According to Heinrich, the chaplain is engaged in critical irrealism, using 
the spiritual realm, or “higher knowledge,” to combat the mundane, which can 
dangerously trap us in its labyrinth. In this passage, Heinrich is also countering the 
merchant’s argument that spiritual matters have no bearing on earthly existence. On the 
contrary, spiritual matters are an integral part of man’s practical existence and prevents 
man from getting trapped in the labyrinth of the mundane.  
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 After observing Heinrich's interest in poetry, the merchants admit that, although 
they find it pleasing to the senses as a representation of nature, they know little about the 
subject. For Marx, the merchant’s appreciation of poetry would not be above the level of 
an animal’s. They know poetry only as a pleasing sensory phenomenon, but since they 
have nothing invested in poetry, they are alienated from it. In order to experience poetry 
as a human, one must find the objectification of man in it; in other words, the object of 
poetry needs to be recognized as a human object. Marx says that “[s]ense which is 
subservient to crude needs has only a restricted meaning. For a starving man the human 
form of food does not exist, but only its abstract character as food. [...] it is impossible to 
say in what way this feeding-activity would differ from that of animals” (EPM 108). The 
merchant’s sense of poetry is restricted, because it serves no practical purpose for them. It 
is not a human object for them, which is why they do not have more than an animalistic 
interest in it.   
 Even though the merchants do not understand poetry, they indulge Heinrich’s 
interest in it with two stories. The first story is about a poet sailing on a ship. The poet 
had accumulated much wealth over time and was in possession of a vast treasure on the 
ship. After discussing the situation among themselves, the sailors decide to take the 
poet’s treasure away and throw him overboard. The sailor’s mysterious reverence for 
poetry is demonstrated by their refusal to listen to the poet sing, which is his last request, 
after which the poet would jump overboard without a fight: “[Die Schiffer] wußten recht 
wohl, daß wenn sie seinen Zaubergesang hörten, ihre Herzen erweicht, und sie von Reue 
ergriffen werden würden” (29) ("[The sailors] knew very well that if they heard his magic 
song, their hearts would be softened and they seized with regret” [34]). The poet sings a 
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song, jumps as previously agreed, and is miraculously rescued and brought to the shore 
by sea creatures. The sailors are left with the treasure, which was quite clearly the seed of 
their own destruction from the very beginning of the story. They are unable to split up the 
treasure evenly and, instead, kill each other fighting over the treasure. The few who 
survive are unable to control the ship on their own and end up crashing into the coast.  
 Removing the poet from the ship in favor of material possessions has disastrous 
consequences for the sailors. The treasure is not nearly as important to the poet. He had 
offered to willingly hand over the treasure to the sailors if they agreed to keep him on the 
ship. This offer did not satisfy the sailors for whom the treasure was more important than 
the life of a poet. The treasure is important to them because it signifies wealth and riches, 
but the meaning it has for them is left very much in doubt. Like the merchants who tell 
the story, the sailors are preoccupied with objects that, in their view, have a practical use. 
In the short term, taking the treasure and killing the victim seemed to be the most 
practical option. The story represents, albeit in a fantastic manner, the human need for 
poetry, or art in general, in direct opposition to the animalistic desire of material riches. 
The sailors knew that a song would make them regret their decision, so they did not listen. 
However, they underestimated their individual greed for wealth. O’Brien states that the 
ship story is Hardenberg’s response to Plato’s Republic, in which the artists are expelled 
from the republic. Hardenberg’s warning is that the state will fail (O’Brien 291-93). The 
story is a warning to groups who hold the practical above art. The practical, in this case 
as well as in the case of the merchants who narrate this story, is an abstract form of 
alienation. They feed on the treasure as animals feed on food, without an appreciation for 
the social value of their objects and without being consciously aware of their separation 
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from nature. The plot of this story feeds into the mystical quality of Novalis, in that poets 
are superhuman beings who can summon the power of nature in their defense in the face 
of danger. Without the fantastic elements, it is a reformulation of Heinrich's concerns 
with the merchant's opinion of his chaplain. The practical is praised at the expense of 
spiritual matters or poetry.  
 The second story the merchants tell is much longer and more complicated. Rather 
than giving a corresponding warning against preferring art at the expense of the practical, 
as the story seems to do in the beginning, the story of the kingdom of Atlantis develops 
both the artistic and the practical spheres in an organic unity, which eventually brings 
prosperity to the kingdom. The king of Atlantis embodies the artistic at the neglect of the 
practical. His love for art is only overshadowed by his love for his daughter, for whom he 
allegedly would do anything. Unfortunately, the latter point is contradicted by the king's 
lofty idea of his heritage, which is sung to him everyday, as he is constantly in the 
presence of singers and poets who praise his kingdom and intoxicate him with grandeur, 
which he may or may not merit: "Seine Dichter hatten ihm unaufhörlich von seiner 
Verwandtschaft mit den ehemaligen übermenschlichen Beherrschern der Welt 
vorgesungen, und in dem Zauberspiegel ihrer Kunst war ihm der Abstand seiner Herkunft 
von dem Ursprunge der andern Menschen, die Herrlichkeit seines Stammes noch heller 
erscheinen" (33) ("His bards had constantly celebrated his kinship to former semidivine 
rulers of the world, and in the magic mirror of their art the superiority of his lineage over 
the origin of other men and the glory of his dynasty appeared to him to shine even more" 
[38]). As a result, the king is very protective of his daughter and will not allow her to 
marry anyone who does not match the grandeur of their alleged family heritage. The 
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continuation of the kingdom under their family's rule, the practical consideration when 
selecting a suitor, is lost in the king's exalted image of his legacy. 
 However, one day while on a walk in the woods, the princess by chance meets a 
father and his son, who represents the practical. The son occupies himself solely with the 
natural sciences, in which his father had instructed him. The meeting between the son and 
the princess as symbols for poetry and science results in a higher consciousness that 
touches both of them deeply. The princess describes her mood after the meeting as a 
partial revealing of the supernatural: "Die Prinzessin hatte sich nie in einem ähnlichen 
Zustande befunden […]. Ein magischer Schleier dehnte sich in weiten Falten um ihr 
klares Bewußtsein. Es war ihr, als würde sie sich, wenn er aufgeschlagen würde, in einer 
überirdischen Welt befinden" (36) ("The Princess had never felt as she did when she 
slowly rode home […]. A magic veil hung itself in great folds around her clear 
consciousness. She felt as though she would find herself in a supernatural world if the 
veil were drawn aside" [40]). After experiencing this heightened revelatory consciousness, 
she no longer feels the same when she returns to her village. She feels alienated from the 
kingdom of poetry at the neglect of practical matters.  
 The two were destined to meet again, which is obvious after the son finds a ruby 
from her necklace in the woods near his home. When the princess noticed that it was 
missing, she went looking for the stone and sees the son again. The princess then begins 
to visit the son more often and the two exchange the secrets of their trades with each 
other. The princess teaches him music, and he teaches her about the natural sciences. 
Once while they were walking in the woods, a strong storm makes it dangerous to 
continue and forces them to seek shelter in a cave. The situation is described in a mystical 
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fashion so that divine providence seems to have provided the situation in which they are 
able to consummate their love. Their love-making seems to be sanctioned by a higher 
being: "Eine höhere Macht schien den Knoten schneller lösen zu wollen, und brachte sie 
unter sonderbaren Umständen in diese romantische Lage" (41) ("A higher power seemed 
to want to undo the knot more quickly and under strange circumstances brought them into 
this romantic situation" [44]).  
 Caves in Heinrich von Afterdingen always signal an important event in self-
discovery. This cave scene mirrors Heinrich's first dream, which represented the birth of 
his Self. And here, it is in this cave that the princess and the son are joined, symbolically 
creating a Self in which poetry and science are combined in a unity. Upon awakening, 
they feel, just as Heinrich did after his first dream, that they are entering a new world. 
Something more tangible also soon would be entering a new world, which necessitates 
the princess, who was forced to disclose her true identity, to spend a year in the home of 
the father and son so as not to wound the king's pride. The king is devastated by her 
disappearance, also because it could result in the end of his dynasty, even if his lack of 
practical sense may have had the same results. The princess and the son, however, enjoy 
sensations of mystical proportions during their time together.  
 After one year, the two return to the kingdom during a festival. The son begins 
singing to attract the villagers' attention. The villagers' reaction to the son, who, because 
of the princess, had taken up incorporating singing into his study of the natural sciences, 
again encourages and perpetuates the myth of Novalis as the divine dreamer who 
embodies a unity of poetry and the natural sciences: "Ein solcher Gesang war nie 
vernommen worden, und alle glaubten, ein himmlisches Wesen sei unter ihnen 
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erschienen" (45) ("Such as song had never been heard, and all believed that a heavenly 
being had appeared among them" [48]). The son sings another song, in which he 
prophesizes, as heavenly beings do, that he will become the king's son. The father brings 
the baby to the king as the son explains the origin of the baby in song. The daughter then 
appears, and the king invites them all to his kingdom and accepts them all as family. The 
kingdom thrived through the union of the princess and the son. The throne was given an 
heir, the practical solution to the king's worries, and the kingdom's poets celebrated in 
their usual joyous fashion. 
 The merchants, with whom Heinrich and his mother traveled to Augsburg, taught 
Heinrich useful lessons in self-development through their two stories. With the ship story, 
they warned about the dangers of neglecting art, evident in the fate of the sailors who had 
favored wealth (a practical advantage) over the unifying power of poetry that threatened 
their sinister plans. With the story of the kingdom of Atlantis, they warned of the dangers 
of the opposite situation in which the practical is neglected at the expense of art. Due to 
the king's pride in his dynasty, exacerbated about by the intoxication of song, the king 
refused his daughter's hand to every suitor who came to court her. The rest of the story of 
Atlantis is devoted to the ideal unity of the practical and spiritual, represented by art and 
science. This unity saves the kingdom in the "practical" matter of self-preservation and in 
the "spiritual" matter of everyone's happiness. These stories, which the merchants do not 
fully understand and which contradict many of their statements in conversation with 
Heinrich, conclude the section of Heinrich von Afterdingen, in which Heinrich's Self is 
developing in response to "indirect methods," such as dreams and stories. In the 
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following chapters, his development is in response to direct contact with other individual 
selves, who embody the ideals of a more fully developed Self.  
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CRUSADERS, THE MINER, AND THE CAVE 
 
 After the first day of travel, the merchants, Heinrich, and his mother arrive at a 
castle and encounter a group of soldiers who had fought in a recent crusade. Heinrich 
listens to their stories and songs, which tell of the wonders of warfare and the 
camaraderie of the soldiers. An excitement for the wars seizes Heinrich when he is 
allowed to hold the sword of the lord of the castle: "Heinrich nahm es in seine Hand, und 
fühlte sich von einer kriegerischen Begeisterung ergriffen. Er küßte es mit inbrünstiger 
Andacht" (51) ("Henry took it in his hands and felt gripped by a war-like enthusiasm. He 
kissed it with fervid admiration" [54]). The song that the soldiers sing excites Heinrich 
further because it poeticizes their camaraderie: "Heinrich's ganze Seele war in Aufruhr 
[…]. Er eilte ins Freie, sein ganzes Gemüt war rege" (54) ("Henry's whole soul was in a 
tumult […]. He hastened out into the open; his whole soul was excited" [57]). According 
to Molnár, Heinrich's naive enthusiasm for the crusades is the result of his longing to 
discover the "underlying unity of mankind" that is represented through the language of 
poetry:  
 Heinrich gained the ability to look through the veil of war's divisiveness to the 
 underlying unity of humankind for which all individuals long as the true home of 
 their language and identity. The language is the language of poetry, which spoke 
 directly to his heart in the crusader's song […]. Each time he felt himself 
 addressed in this manner, the confines of his individuated selfhood expanded in 
 an awareness of his identity with others. (Molnár 139) 
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However, the language of poetry, when used by Zulima, a victim of the crusades, 
persuades Heinrich that war is not a means for discovering the unity of mankind.  
Heinrich's immediate identification with Zulima is not surprising, because the verses of 
her song are very similar to Heinrich's dream: "Hier, wo um kristallne Quellen / Liebend 
sich der Himmel legt, / Und mit heißen Balsamwellen / Um den Hain zusammenschlägt 
[…] / Fern sind jene Jugendträume! / Abwärts liegt das Vaterland!" (56) (Here around the 
crystal fountains / Heaven bends in eastern mauve / And from balsam-fragrant mountains 
/ clings around the sacred grove […] / Dreams of youth are transitory, / Distant lies my 
fatherland" [58-59]). Zulima was taken away from her fatherland, and her image of it is 
as distant as a youth's dream. Similarly–and symbolically–Heinrich was taken away from 
his transitory dream, his "fatherland," when he was awakened by his mother. He is now 
on the journey in hopes of finding the blue flower once again.  
 Heinrich's initial excitement about the crusades and the veiled camaraderie with 
the soldiers changes after meeting the crusade victim Zulima. He realizes that violence 
among men is violence against the Self as well. Molnár explains war in Heinrich von 
Afterdingen as the result of self-centeredness. Molnár writes that self-centered people 
"recogniz[e] others not as fellow beings but only as agents to be employed for [their] 
gratification" (153). They tend to define their worth in terms of possessions:  
 [T]hey may be personal possessions on whose terms the individual status is 
 determined; in a wider sense, they may be shared, like the land of the tribal or 
 national society on whose terms the self relates to others, or like the common 
 objects of worship, the holy places, the divine symbols […]. However, when it 
 happens that the relative social or religious frameworks of definition are 
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 challenged by alternative versions, the self's very identity is at stake. Such 
 insecurity may, if sufficiently acute, result in war. (153) 
The crusades, which were fought over, among other matters, territory and religious sites, 
contradict Hardenberg's theory of self-development. The dissolution of the distinction 
between Subject and Object cannot be realized in the self-centered, or Subject-centered, 
person. The items which are being fought for are valueless if pursued by a self-centered 
person. According to Marx, objects have human value only insofar as they are social, that 
is, that the objects are consciously produced with the understanding that individual labor 
is the means to a social end (EPM 107). Having many self-centered people fight for them 
does not make them social, rather it is the knowledge that the objects are for the benefit 
of humanity that they are social. The crusader's religious fervor blinded them to their 
ultimately selfish acts, which really are in opposition to humane acts that would not result 
in the victimization of people like Zulima. The crusaders in Heinrich von Afterdingen 
fight selfishly over objects, possessing no real value, and in so doing hurt themselves by 
hurting others, since the distinction between Subject and Object is an illusion that one 
must strive to overcome, as referenced earlier in Hardenberg. 
 In the next village where the travelers stop to rest, they encounter an old miner. 
The old miner is an actual, living model of a worker who is not alienated from his labor, 
the product of his labor, or himself. The miner tells of the joys of his occupation and 
compares his spiritual contentment in his work with the material necessities required for 
the body: "[M]ir schienen sie (die volle Befriedigung eines angebornen Wunsches) so 
unentbehrlich zu sein, wie die Luft der Brust und die Speise dem Magen" (64-65) ("[T]o 
me they [the complete satisfaction of an inborn desire] appeared as indispensable as air 
 
 57
for the lungs or food for the stomach" [67]). The miner discusses further the value that his 
occupation has afforded him in connection with the objects of his labor: precious stones. 
The miner does not wish to possess the precious stones that he finds. It is rather the 
search for them, his labor, that gives them value: "Sie haben keinen Reiz mehr, wenn sie 
Waren geworden sind" (67) ("They have no charm for him any more once they are turned 
into commercial articles" [69]). Despite the miner's disinterest in commodities, he does 
uphold the fetishism of commodities as a natural order when referring to the lofty place 
that the precious stones receive. The miner brings the stones to the surface "damit er an 
königlichen Kronen und Gefäßen und an heiligen Reliquien zu Ehren gelangen, und in 
geachteten und wohlverwahrten Münzen, mit Bildnissen geziert, die Welt beherrschen 
und leiten möge" (65) ("so that he might attain to honor in royal crowns and vessels and 
holy relics, and might rule and direct the world in the form of respected and well-
preserved coins adorned with portraits" [67]). The commodities acquire a mystical 
character and can symbolically rule by adorning royalty and providing material wealth. In 
Capital, Marx explains that the mystical character of commodities results in the fetishism 
thereof, which is also evident in the miner's remarks. The commodity has no value in 
itself: "[T]he commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within 
which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the 
commodity and the material [dinglich] relations arising out of this."1 The value of 
commodities is a social construction that is reproduced by the miner's willingness always 
to put the precious stones in what he assumes to be their "rightful" place. The miner's 
obliviousness to the artificialness of the value assigned to precious stones on the surface, 
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or above ground, does not however affect the joy in spirit and body that he receives from 
searching for them. 
 Near the village is a cave, which the villagers think is filled with monsters and 
dragons. The old miner decides to explore this cave and offers to take those who are 
willing, including Heinrich, with him inside the cave. This is the third cave that appears 
in Heinrich von Afterdingen. Much like the previous two caves, the cave in Heinrich's 
dream and the cave in the story of Atlantis, it signals an important revelation of the unity 
that is essential to Heinrich's self-development. It is the most mysterious and mystical of 
the caves, because the distinction between past, present, and future, as well as that 
between dream and reality is dissolved.  
 Once in the cave, Heinrich and the old miner begin to hear someone singing from 
deeper within the cave. They come to encounter a man, who had been living in the cave 
for many years. Time has no authority over this man and his age is not recognizable by 
Heinrich or the miner: "Es war ein Mann, dessen Alter man nicht erraten konnte. Er sah 
weder alt noch jung aus, keine Spuren der Zeit bemerkte man an ihm" (79) ("It was a man 
whose age one could not guess. He appeared neither young nor old; one could detect no 
marks of time on him" [80]). Just as descending into a cave is a descent through time 
since the older rock is deeper in the cave, the man in the cave, Friedrich Hohenzollern, 
imagines himself as a dream of the future in a time of peace when the past violence, 
resulting in the formation of the cave, seemingly has come to a stop. Heinrich's 
experience in the cave is also characterized as a time-warp: "Wie lange Jahre lagen die 
eben vergangenen Stunden hinter ihm, und er glaubte nie anders gedacht und empfunden 
zu haben" (89) ("The hours just gone by lay behind him like long years, and he imagined 
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he never had thought and felt otherwise" [90]). Heinrich happens upon an artifact that 
illustrates the time-warp of the cave more tangibly. He opens a book in Hohenzollern's 
library and is fascinated by its mysterious nature. The book has no title, no ending, and is 
written in a language that Heinrich cannot understand. The pictures in the book contain 
figures that are familiar from the past, including his own figure; images of the present, 
including a picture of Heinrich, the miner, and Hohenzollern; and encouraging scenes 
depicting his future. The book in the cave parallels Heinrich von Afterdingen and 
highlights its relevance for Heinrich as well as for readers outside the novel. Heinrich 
recognizes a path for self-development in the mysterious book, just as readers can read 
Heinrich von Afterdingen as a guide-book toward self-development, according to 
Hardenberg's theories. Hardenberg's work is depicted as being important to its reader at a 
time of literary, philosophical, and political change. Calhoon points out that the book 
makes an argument in favor of the relevancy of dreams, a tendency in Romantic works, 
against Heinrich's father's insistence that only older texts have useful knowledge to 
impart: "The structural counterpart of the manuscript in Hohenzollern's cave is the spring 
at the heart of Heinrich's dream-cave; both are sources (Quellen), and the association of 
written text and dream contradicts Heinrich's skeptical father who declares that old texts 
are the only 'sources' of true revelation" (102). Hardenberg is incorporating a defense of 
the timelessness of his theories and the legitimacy of his enterprise in cultivating new soil, 
as his pseudonym, Novalis, suggests. 
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 1 Karl Marx, Capital trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1990) 165. 
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ARRIVAL IN AUGSBURG AND THE ENCOUNTER WITH MATHILDE AND 
KLINGSOHR 
 
 Leading up to Heinrich's arrival in Augsburg, he encountered people from many 
different walks of life and had the opportunity to learn lessons in the art of self-
development through stories and personal examples. In theoretical terms, Heinrich's 
Subject incorporated many Objects through active passivity, the reciprocal relationship of 
two Subjects simultaneously active in their incorporation of the other and passive in 
allowing the incorporation to take place (Molnár 113). The lessons given and received in 
this process reflected the blending of the spiritual and material spheres. The alienation, 
which characterizes figures such as Heinrich's father and the merchants and which is 
lacking in the old miner, is illuminated through critical irrealism, the opposition of the 
fantastic elements of dreams and stories to the monotonous alienated activity of modern 
man. Although Heinrich's development is not finished upon his arrival in Augsburg, he is 
very aware of the journey that he has taken and its significance for his understanding of 
the world and himself: "Mannigfaltige Zufälle schienen sich zu seiner Bildung zu 
vereinigen, und noch hatte nichts seine innere Regsamkeit gestört. Alles was er sah und 
hörte schien nur neue Regel in ihm wegzuschieben, und neue Fenster ihm zu öffnen. Er 
sah die Welt in ihren großen und abwechselnden Verhältnissen vor sich liegen" (94-95) 
("Diverse circumstances seemed to have united in his development, and as yet nothing 
had disturbed his inner activity. Everything he saw and heard seemed merely to push 
aside new door-bolts in him and to open new windows for him. He saw the world lying 
before him in its great and changing relations" [94]). Heinrich's Self has expanded greatly 
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in its incorporation of Objects and has allowed the circumference of the absolute sphere 
to be redrawn in ever bigger proportions. During his time in Augsburg his development 
in the realization of love, or in Hardenberg's theory, the You, continues. There, he also 
acquires a mentor who guides him in his further development. 
  From this point Heinrich's development advances particularly because he 
encounters two important individuals: Klingsohr, a wise poet, and his daughter Mathilde. 
Upon Heinrich's arrival, his grandfather is having a party, at which Klingsohr and 
Mathilde are both present. Heinrich at once notices Klingsohr as being one of the figures 
he saw in Hohenzollern's book and thus immediately wants to make his acquaintance. 
Heinrich's grandfather apologizes to Mathilde on behalf of Heinrich, who failed to notice 
her before he noticed her father. After introducing Heinrich to Mathilde, his grandfather 
parts with these amusing words: "Eure glänzenden Augen werden schon die 
schlummernde Jugend in ihm wekken. In seinem Vaterlande kommt der Frühling spät" 
(98) ("Your shining eyes will surely awaken his dormant youth. Spring comes late in his 
home land" [97]). The meeting between Heinrich and Mathilde is the culmination of a 
long foreshadowing in Heinrich von Afterdingen. Not only does Heinrich recognize that 
it was her face that he had seen in the blue flower in his dream, but also his mother had 
made a comment about meeting a girl in Augsburg at the outset of their journey: "[D]ie 
Reize einer jungen Landsmännin würden die Trübe Laune ihres Sohnes vertreiben, und 
wieder einen so teilnehmenden und lebensfrohen Menschen aus ihm machen, wie er sonst 
gewesen" (18) ([T]he charms of a girl in her native Augsburg would dispel the gloomy 
mood of her son and restore his former cheerful and sociable spirit" [24]). The merchants 
also join in talking about the girls in Augsburg at the beginning of the journey: "[G]ewiß 
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sind in ganz Deutschland keine unbescholtenere Mädchen und keine treuere Frauen, als 
in Schwaben. Ja, junger Freund, in der klaren warmen Luft des südlichen Deutschlands 
werdet Ihr Eure erste Schüchternheit wohl ablegen" (22-3) ("[C]erntainly in all Germany 
there are no girls more blameless and no wives more faithful than those in Suabia. Yes, 
young friend, in the clear warm air of southern Germany you will no doubt slough off 
your sober shyness" [28]). The preparation for meeting Mathilde had been long underway. 
  It would be a mistake to consider the relationship between Heinrich and Mathilde 
as a realistic representation of a relationship between two adolescents. They are 
infatuated with each other immediately and soon are reduced only to saying each other's 
names. Mathilde's speech is very limited when conversing with Heinrich, and she fades 
away in a dream almost as quickly as she appears at the party. Mathilde highlights her 
diminished role in her own dialogue: "[M]ir ist, als finge ich erst jetzt zu leben an" (118) 
("[I]t seems to me that I am only now beginning to live" [116]). Mathilde plays no role in 
Heinrich von Afterdingen at all except to function as a symbol for the You.  
 The realization of the You is the closest approximation of unity between the I, the 
Non-I, and the Absolute. The I and Non-I must be passively active towards one another, 
making love an art not a given. The unity of these spheres for Hardenberg is his 
definition of perfect love.  He uses the term perfect love, because although love can be 
experienced, the unity of the I, the Non-I, and the Absolute, can never be attained and 
must settle for being approximated. Perfect love only exists in theory because the Self is 
always in a state of becoming, or a state of constant activity incorporating Objects. The 
Absolute is impossible to attain. Hardenberg describes his theory of love in the 
Allgemeine Brouillon:  
 
 64
 Nature will become moral–when out of a genuine love of art–it devotes itself to 
 art–does what art wishes–and when art, through a genuine love of Nature–lives 
 for Nature, works in accordance with Nature. Thus both must act at the same 
 time, out of their own choice–and for their own sakes–and out of this foreign 
 choice for the sake of the other. They must encounter the other in themselves, and 
 themselves in the other. (12). 
Active passivity and the otherness in subjectivity in Hardenberg's theory are highlighted 
in the above passage. As previously mentioned, this definition of love is echoed by Erich 
Fromm in Marx's Concept of Man: "By relating himself to the objective world, through 
his powers, the world outside becomes real to man, and in fact it is only 'love' which 
makes man truly believe in the reality of the objective world outside himself. Subject and 
object cannot be separated" (28). According to Fromm, love is the answer to alienation in 
Marx. Love, in Hardenberg, is the key to self-development, meaning that the developed 
self is one that is not alienated from the Self's Self. Mathilde represents the other Self, or 
I, which is acting reciprocally with Heinrich. Heinrich says that after meeting Mathilde 
he feels like he did in his first dream when he glimpsed the blue flower, the event that 
started his journey of self-discovery. Mathilde's life becomes synonymous with 
Heinrich's inner self. In one of his dreams, she appears in a boat that begins to be pulled 
under water. Heinrich tries hard to swim out to rescue her, but he can never quite reach 
her, no matter how far or fast he swims. She drowns. Mathilde's death, which is only 
presented in this dream and not in the narrative outside of a dream, underscores the 
constant activity of the Self in approximating the unity between the I, Non-I, and the 
Absolute through active passivity. Mathilde's death demonstrates the fleeting nature of 
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the You. Love is not automatically maintained, but must be cultivated like any other art. 
In The Art of Loving, Fromm say that love is an art that continuously must be sought after: 
"[T]he mastery of [an] art must be a matter of ultimate concern; there must be nothing 
else in the world more important than the art. This holds true for music, for medicine, for 
carpentry– and for love."1 In the unfinished second part of Heinrich von Afterdingen, 
Mathilde appears once more to Heinrich and answers his question as to where they are 
going in a curious fashion: "Immer nach Hause" (164) ("Home, all the time" [159]). The 
Self is always in state of coming to the Self's Self.  
 This idea of identifying the Self with the Other is seen by some scholars to be 
narcissistic. For example, Kenneth Calhoon, as referenced earlier, said that Heinrich is 
the embodiment of narcissism because he confuses himself for Mathilde and mistaking 
another for yourself is narcissistic: "[C]onfusion of the self for an Other is the essence of 
narcissism” (Calhoon 82). Gail Newman is of the same opinion as Calhoon. According to 
Newman, the entire work of Novalis (Newman refers to Hardenberg exclusively as 
Novalis in the referenced article) has a tendency toward narcissism. She points out that 
the relationship between Heinrich and Mathilde is an allusion "to the myth of the boy 
who fell in love with his own mirror image" (66). She also points out that the style of the 
dialogue highlights what she calls narcissism, that is, the merging of subject and object: 
"Readers find themselves confronted by a sea of quotation marks that renders it difficult 
to discern who is speaking at any given moment" (66). However, I am of the same 
opinion as Hodkinson, who says that the relationship is not narcissistic, but rather a form 
of radical subjectivity, since the nature of self-development necessitates communion with 
other selves (143). According to Hardenberg, self-development is impossible without the 
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appropriation of Others. Other subjects have the same freedom of appropriation as does 
the Self.  
 Mathilde's father, Klingsohr, is a well-known poet in Augsburg and the 
embodiment of the developed Self. He immediately sees Heinrich's potential and accepts 
him as an apprentice in order that he also might become a great poet. Klingsohr speaks of 
poets and poetry in a much broader sense than traditional ideas of poetry: "Es ist recht 
übel […] daß die Poesie einen besondern Namen hat, und die Dichter eine besondere 
Zunft ausmachen. Es ist gar nichts Besonderes. Es ist die eigentümliche Handlungsweise 
des menschlichen Geistes. Dichtet und Trachtet jeder Mensch in jeder Minute?" (117) ("It 
is too bad […] that poesy has a special name and that poets make up a special guild. It is 
not anything special at all. It is the peculiar mode of activity of the human mind. Does not 
everybody use his mind and his imagination all the time?" [116]). Poetry here is defined 
as the activity of the Self. Heinrich von Afterdingen is about poetry in this broad sense. 
Heinrich has aspirations of becoming a great poet, but does not once write a poem in the 
novel. Heinrich von Afterdingen's plot has its roots in a historical event in which the 
historical Heinrich won a song-competition in Wartburg in 1206 (Calhoon 102). 
Hardenberg used the historical poet, Heinrich, as the basis for Heinrich in Afterdingen. 
This knowledge that Afterdingen is based on a historical figure, who was a poet, is what 
could lead readers to read Afterdingen as the story of a poet instead of a story about 
general self-development. The use of a historical account of an actual poet is irrelevant to 
an interpretation of Afterdingen as an allegorical narrative demonstrating Hardenberg's 
philosophy.  
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 Klingsohr and Heinrich have a lengthy discussion about the nature of poetry, war, 
and language, and Klingsohr starts giving Heinrich advice on how to become a great poet. 
His advice is the same advice that Heinrich had received indirectly through stories and 
dreams and directly through characters he met along his journey, such as the old miner. 
Klingsohr recommends experience as the foundation of poetry (116) and also says that 
spiritual matters cannot be emphasized at the neglect of material or practical matters:  
 [E]in anderes ist es mit der Natur für unsern Genuß und unser Gemüt, ein anderes 
 mit der Natur für unsern Verstand, für das leitende Vermögen unserer Weltkräfte. 
 Man muß sich wohl hüten, nicht eins über das andere zu vergessen. Es gibt viele, 
 die nur die eine Seite kennen und die andere geringschätzen. Aber beide kann 
 man vereinigen, und man wird sich wohl dabei befinden. (109). 
 (Nature is one thing to our enjoyment and our soul, another to our intellect, to the 
 directive ability of our cosmic forces. One must be careful not to neglect either 
 one for the other. But one can unite the two and thereby be in excellent fettle. A 
 pity that so few apply their minds to a free and able inner activity and by a 
 thorough discrimination secure the most purposeful and natural use of their 
 mental powers. [108]) 
To optimize the use of one's mental faculties, Klingsohr advises a delicate balance 
between the use of reason and the soul, or the spiritual realm. The realm of the soul has 
been shown to encompass the search for meaning in the imagination and in dreams, as 
opposed to, for example, Heinrich's father's objection that one cannot derive any 
meaningful message from dreams. The soul also encompasses the engagement with the 
arts as did the important characters in the ship story and the story about Atlantis, as well 
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as experiencing joy in one's labor, as is the case with the old miner. The miner is not 
alienated from his labor or the product of his labor. His work inspires him instead of 
exhausting him. His labor is not forced, but rather he chose the life of a miner because it 
appealed to his natural inclinations of discovery. He does not assign a natural value to the 
precious stones that he finds, which have no value as such, but rather readily gives them 
to those who have assigned a value to them.  
 Reason has been shown to include the investigation of matters of the soul, as 
evidenced by Heinrich's preoccupation with the meaning of his first dream and the wealth 
of information he discovers as a result. The meaning of Heinrich's dream is not evident to 
him at the beginning. He must search for the meaning following clues, such as those in 
the book in the cave, which illustrate his past, present, and future. Klingsohr makes the 
importance of reason even more clear in another passage:  
 Ich kann Euch nicht genug anrühmen, Euren Verstand, Euren natürlichen Trieb zu 
 wissen, wie alles sich begibt und untereinander nach Gesetzen der Folge 
 zusammenhängt, mit Fleiß und Mühe zu unterstützen. Nichts ist dem Dichter 
 unentbehrlicher, als Einsicht in die Natur jedes Geschäfts, Bekanntschaft mit den 
 Mitteln jeden Zweck zu erreichen, und Gegenwart des Geistes, nach Zeit und 
 Umständen, die schicklichsten zu wählen. Begeisterung ohne Verstand ist unnütz 
 und gefährlich, und der Dichter wird wenig Wunder tun können, wenn er selbst 
 über wunder erstaunt. (109-10) 
 (I cannot sufficiently urge you laboriously and diligently to cultivate your 
 intelligence, your natural impulse to know how everything happens and logically 
 and sequentially hangs together. Nothing is more needful for the poet than insight 
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 into the nature of every occupation, acquaintance with the means to attain every 
 end, and presence of mind to select the most fitting means according to time and 
 circumstance. Enthusiasm without intelligence is useless and dangerous, and the 
 poet will be capable of few miracles if he himself is astonished by miracles. 
 [108-09]) 
This is a plea to occupy oneself with science, the exploration of the logical order of 
things through rational thought. He is advocating analytical thought over blind action. 
Klingsohr confirms what others, whom Heinrich encountered along his journey, had 
taught him. One must work at a delicate balance between the soul and reason, or between 
the spiritual and the practical. 
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 1 Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956) 5. 
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CONCLUSION: THE GOLDEN AGE OF HARDENBERG 
 
 In this study I have demonstrated that, in his writing and in his personal life, 
Friedrich von Hardenberg was concerned with man's material existence. A man of his 
genius, as August Cölestin Just, with whom Hardenberg worked as salt mine assessor, 
suggests in his biographical testimony of Hardenberg (Donehower 110-11), could hardly 
neglect material existence and only focus on his inner life or on spiritual matters. Just 
points out that Hardenberg was a genius because of his abilities in his profession as salt 
mine assessor, not despite them: [T]his person possesses outstanding spiritual abilities to 
learn every science easily, to penetrate a subject to its depths, to seize upon it with 
certainty, order it with wisdom, and judge it with the soundest critical faculties; he 
possesses these same strengths in all his spiritual faculties" (111). Practical and spiritual 
matters are both emphasized in Just's definition of genius. Hardenberg's genius, according 
to Just's definition, is very present in Heinrich von Afterdingen. Using various theories of 
Karl Marx, especially those concerning alienation, in an interpretation of Afterdingen 
illuminates the emphases that Hardenberg put on material existence. According to 
Hardenberg's own theory of self-development, it would be absolutely impossible for the 
Self to develop at all without relationships with other Selves. The Self's activity 
necessitates a Non-I. If it were true, as the Novalis myths would have one believe, that 
Hardenberg was mostly concerned with himself or his spiritual being only, Hardenberg 
would have no authority to write a theory in which otherness is central to subjectivity. 
 Heinrich's Self is the one which is portrayed in Afterdingen. After many 
encounters with Others, he symbolically realizes the You in his relationship with 
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Mathilde. Some of the Others that he encounters are imperfect models of Selves. The 
merchants and Heinrich's own father are examples of these. The encounters with the old 
miner and Klingsohr reveal to Heinrich that people do not have to be bound by alienation, 
but rather can reach a high level of self-development. Hardenberg died before he could 
finish Afterdingen. The second part remains a fragment and was not discussed in this 
study. The first part of Afterdingen leaves Heinrich in the care of the great poet Klingsohr, 
who advises Heinrich to make full use of his mental faculties in science as well as art. 
 A complement to this study would be an exploration of fantastic elements in the 
writing of Marx. This element of Marx's writing is highlighted by Daniel Bensaïd in 
Marx for Our Times.1 Bensaïd writes of the commodity in Capital in a fantastic fashion: 
"The totality inhabits each link, each fragment, each detail of the chain. Yet there is one 
that encapsulates and discloses the whole: being, Proust's madeleine, the commodity" 
(242). Capital begins with the commodity. Bensaïd charts the mystical character of the 
commodity, an imperfect beginning according to Bensaïd, in Marx's attempt to find its 
lost unity "in the organic life of capital" (243). Bensaïd does not spend much time on this 
subject, but the foundations for further study are present in his work.  
 A complementary endeavor focusing on the fantastic elements in Marx is very 
difficult considering the distortions of Marx's theories. The name Karl Marx carries with 
it much historical and ideological baggage. I do not feel that Marx has gotten the 
attention he deserves in the United States, even on university campuses. The political 
theory course that I took on this campus presented a completely backwards perspective 
on materialism that resulted in my having almost no interest in Marx for many years 
afterward. The leading view of Marx was one in which he was only concerned with 
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material possessions and ensuring that everyone in society had possessions. Fromm 
addresses this widespread falsification in Marx's Concept of Man: "I want to emphasize 
the irony which lies in the fact that the description given of the aim of Marx and of the 
content of his vision of socialism, fits almost exactly the reality of present-day Western 
capitalist society" (2). Marx wanted to liberate man "from the chains of economic 
determinism" (2) so that man could focus on self-development and, as Fromm points out, 
"spiritual emancipation" (2). If a study of the fantastic elements in Marx were to be done, 
it would be worth considering including a section on the falsifications of Marx's theories. 
Such a section would be as necessary as is the section on the myths associated with 
Hardenberg is in this study.  
 Hardenberg frequently wrote about a "Golden Age," a time in which his theories 
would be realized. It is written about in a variety of contexts, in "both his mystical and his 
practical projects" (O'Brien 113). O'Brien explains its usage as an "intersection of the 
practical and the Ideal" (113). A passage in the Allgemeine Brouillon illustrates this 
intersection: 
 Note that all treatment of error leads to error [to truth]. (Idealization of 
 realism–and realization of idealism leads to truth. One works for the other–and 
 hence indirectly for itself. In order to work directly for idealism, the idealist must 
 seek to prove realism–and vice versa.–The proof of realism is idealism–and vice 
 versa. If he wishes to prove idealism directly, he arrives at 0.–i.e. he forever turns 
 round in a circle–or better, he remains in the same spot–All proof proceeds toward 
 its opposite. […]. There exists a sphere in which every proof is a circle–or an 
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 error–where nothing may be demonstrated–that is the sphere of the developed 
 Golden Age. (115) 
The practical and the ideal are expressed as realism and idealism. Idealism must prove its 
opposite in order to prove itself, because they are both part of the intersection, or a part of 
the unity in which the proof is a circle, that of the Absolute. In my study, idealism and 
materialism have been used to enhance the meaning of the other. The Golden Age 
escapes complete realization, just as the Absolute cannot be fully attained, but only 
approximated, by the I. However, the attempt at approximation is necessary for the Self 
to develop, as is the realization of man as an end and not just as a means in order to 
escape alienation. Both alienation from labor and from the product of labor, as well as the 
inactivity of the Self, stifle self-development and result in estrangement from oneself and 
from society. Otherness is essential to the Self in Hardenberg and Marx because humans 
are social beings. Heinrich von Afterdingen demonstrates this ethical realization, the 
intersection of the practical and the ideal, in its full implications not just for dreams and 
poetry, but also for labor in the material relationship between humans.  
 I have shown that the writing of Karl Marx complements that of Hardenberg. In 
this study, I have broken down the myths surrounding Hardenberg and demonstrated that 
he is not "just" a poet shrouded in mystery and obliviousness. Rather, his novella 
Heinrich von Afterdingen aptly illuminates the importance of man's material existence in 
self-development. Heinrich von Afterdingen describes the importance of man's material 
existence as well as his spiritual existence and exemplifies how they are complementary, 
rather than mutually exclusive. This relationship can be detected in many of Hardenberg's 
works if one is willing to see through the myths that limit the interpretation of 
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Hardenberg. The Golden Age of so-called "Novalis studies" can be attained in this 
manner.  
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 1 Daniel Bensaïd, Marx for Our Times, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso,  
 
2002). 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
 IMPORTANT DATES CONCERNING FRIEDRICH VON HARDENBERG 
 
 
 
1772  2 May: Friedrich von Hardenberg born in Oberwiederstedt, in Thuringia. 
 
1784  Family moves to Weißenfels near Leipzig. 
  Father appointed director of the Saxon salt mines. 
 
1786/1787 Hardenberg makes his first serious attempts at poetry. 
 
1790  Meets Friedrich Schiller at the University of Jena. He also takes care of  
  Schiller when he is sick. 
 
1791  Attends the University of Leipzig. 
 
1792  Meets Friedrich Schlegel in Leipzig. 
 
1794  First meeting with Sophie von Kühn at Grüningen 
 
1795  Becomes secretly engaged to Sophie in March. 
  His study of Fichte begins in the fall. 
  Appointed to Saxon salt mines directorate as assistant in December. 
 
1797  19 March: Death of Sophie 
  His brother Erasmus dies one month later. 
 
1798  Publishes Blütenstaub (Pollen), Blumen, and Glaube und Liebe under the  
  pseudonym "Novalis." 
 
1799  Appointed associate director of Saxon salt mines. 
  Meets Ludwig Tieck in Jena. 
  Writes Die Christenheit oder Europa, Geistliche Lieder, Hymnen an die  
  Nacht, and begins Heinrich von Afterdingen. 
 
1800  Finishes first part of Afterdingen. 
  Becomes ill with tuberculosis. 
 
1801  Hardenberg taken to Weißenfels. 
  Dies on 25 March with Friedrich Schlegel at his side.
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Friedrich von Hardenberg: 
 
FS   Fichte Studies. Ed. Jane Kneller. Cambridge: UP, 2003. 
 
PF   Fragmente und Studien. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2001. 
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    Trans. Ed. David W. Wood. New York: State U of New  
    York P, 2007. 
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 Karl Marx: 
 
C   Capital. Trans. Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin, 1990. 
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EPM   Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Trans. T.B. Bottomore.  
    London: Continuum, 2004. 
 
GI   The German Ideology. Ed. C.J. Arthur. New York:  International  
    Publishers, 2001. 
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